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The current focus of the Global War on terror in the Middle East and in increased 
surveillance on U.S. borders has left a third border, the Caribbean, open to terrorist 
infiltration and attack. Large scale U.S. direct investment in the industrialized island 
nation of Trinidad and Tobago relative to the other islands in the region and Latin 
America, and the U.S. current dependence on it for the majority of its liquefied natural 
gas imports, makes it an attractive target for terror. While there has been reasonable 
research on the effects of a domestic terrorist attack on the American economy, there has 
been little research on the effects of an attack on one of the United State’s critical energy 
sources. This thesis will examine this subject and analyze the possibility of such an attack 
and the projected dire consequences for Trinidad and Tobago, the region and U.S. energy 
security initiatives. This thesis will also attempt to focus on some policy implications for 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND  
Since the tragic events of September 11th, 2001 security and intelligence services 
worldwide have attempted to ascertain the strategy, capability, links and potential targets 
of transnational terrorists. This effort has continued in concert with the hardening of 
potential targets and the hunt for and prosecution of terrorists by law enforcement and 
military units supported by multilateral law enforcement and security cooperation. 
A commonly understood strategy of Al Qaeda affiliated groups is the targeting of 
economic targets, and specifically, oil and gas facilities. Al Qaeda communiqués have 
made specific appeals for all “mujahideen” to attack energy targets in countries in which 
Western oil companies operate.1 On September 6, 2005, Saudi security forces, in 
conjunction with the capture of Al Qaeda affiliated militants at Ad Dammam, seized 
plans for the attack on an array of oil and gas targets.2 Indeed the frequency and severity 
of insurgent attacks on Iraq’s energy infrastructure, illustrates the application of this 
strategy and its importance in the overall insurgent campaign in denying resources to the 
fledgling Iraqi Government. In response to the perceived increase in threat, many large 
oil and gas corporations have increased security at their facilities.3
If attacking energy targets is an integral part of linked militant Islamic group’s 
strategy, then the country of Trinidad and Tobago may be a reasonably accessible and 
vulnerable target for the application of this strategy.4 The local energy infrastructure is 
 
1 Tamara Makarenko “Terrorist Threat to Energy Infrastructure Increases;” Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, May 21, 2003. 
2 Adnan Malik, “Saudi Forces Overrun Militants Villa,” Associated Press, 6 September, 2005. 
Available from World News 
http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stries/S/SAUDI_Clash?SITE=KING&SECTION=HOME&TEMP, Last 
accessed October 8, 2005. 
3 Jimmy Burns & Thomas Catan “Oil Groups Face Rise in Threats to Security,” Financial Times, 
October 5, 2005. 
4 “The current focus on energy security remains lacking and limited, with a rather outdated reliance on 
the more traditional perspective of concentrating on the risks posed by instability and insecurity in the 
Middle Eastern oil producing region.” Richard Giragosian, “Energy Security in East Asia,” Institute for the 
Analysis of Global Security Online, August 13, 2004. Available from http://www.iags.org/n0813042.htm, 
Last accessed September 28, 2005. 
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vulnerable, and is tied to the economy of the Caribbean region, and Trinidad and Tobago 
has recently been described as the energy and financial capital of the Caribbean.5 The 
local energy sector accounts for forty percent of the island’s economy and exports from 
Trinidad and Tobago account for 84% of the region’s inter-island trade. Revenue from 
Trinidad and Tobago’s gas rents have also underwritten stability and economic 
development in the smaller islands through loans, grants, subsidies, and financial 
assistance. More important, exports from it form a key part of the energy security strategy 
of the United States and it presently exports 88% of the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
used in the United States.  
While a significant or sustained terrorist attack on the Trinidad and Tobago’s 
energy sector would be potentially devastating for Trinidad and Tobago and the local 
region, the supply disruption would likely have a significant impact on the U.S. economy 
because of Trinidad’s key energy supply role. It is this three-fold effect, which makes it 
an attractive target because it provides terrorists with a series of large scale national, and 
regional economic disruptions, which will also be felt in the ultimate target: the United 
States. The utility of this approach for transnational terrorist groups is that this can be 
achieved by targeting a relatively small, lightly defended target, in a little known island. 
What is the possibility of terrorist activity taking place in Trinidad and Tobago? 
In July 1990, Islamic Militants known as the Jamaat al Muslimeen (JAM), attempted to 
establish the first Islamic state in the Western Hemisphere, in Trinidad and Tobago, by 
armed revolution. Twenty-six people died and hundreds were wounded in the bombing, 
shooting and hostage crisis that played out in the country’s Parliamentary Chamber and 
state television station. Security forces eventually took control and forced the surrender 
of the militants some six days after the attempt was initiated. While the Government was 
able to resolve the immediate crisis by providing an amnesty that freed the militants 
involved, the threat posed by radical Islamic elements continues until this day. 
 
5 Jwarla Rambarran, “Financial Crises in T&T: Can They Happen Again?” Trinidad Express, March 
16, 2005. Available from http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=67223206, Last accessed 
September 28, 2005. & Editorial Trinidad Express Online, “Caribbean Energy Initiatives,” November 17, 
2004: Available from http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=4666924, Last accessed 
September 28, 2005. 
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Terrorist activity in the Caribbean, while generally perceived not to be of strategic 
importance to the United States has increased within the last decade.6 Terrorist groups 
with confirmed links to the Al Qaeda network are believed to operate in Venezuela and 
Margarita.7 Venezuela lies just seven miles from Trinidad and Tobago, and this 
proximity makes it feasible that an attack could be planned and initiated from these cells.  
In March 2003 U.S. Federal investigators announced publicly that they were 
searching for Adnan El Shukri Jumah, an American man, named by a top Al Qaeda 
operative as a trained terrorist and on the FBI's most wanted terrorist list. El Shukri 
Jumah had returned home to visit relatives in Georgetown Guyana during Ramadan 2001, 
but authorities lost track of Jumah in Trinidad and Tobago on his way back to the United 
States. It was believed that he was traveling on a false Trinidad and Tobago passport.8 In 
the same month, British and U.S. oil companies received threats targeting their facilities 
in Trinidad and Tobago. A letter was also published in a local newspaper by an unknown 
group that made threats relating to the possibility of a chemical attack against citizens and 
a threat to poison the nation’s water supply. To date no one has been arrested for these 
threats.  
In 2005, four low-grade improvised explosive devices, exploded in the business 
districts of Trinidad and Tobago’s capital, Port of Spain, resulting in the injury of 34 
people.9 Suspicions were immediately cast on the Jamaat al Muslimeen and security 
forces from Trinidad and Tobago Army/Special Anti-Crime Unit raided the compound of 
the Jamaat Al Muslimeen three hours after the October explosion. Four members of the 
Jamaat Al Muslimeen were detained for questioning including Jamaat leader Abu Bakr. 
All of the persons detained for questioning have since been released, and the search for 
the individuals responsible for these attacks continues.  
 
6 British Scotland Yard monitors Afro-Caribbean mosques as one of its top priorities of its anti-
terrorist, intelligence gathering operations. Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam. 
London:I. B. Tauris, 2004, p. 284. 
7 LaVerle Berry, et al., “A Global Overview of Narcotics Terrorist and other Extremist Groups.,” 
Washington: Library of Congress, 2002.  
8 FBI Official Website. Available from http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/elshukrijumah.htm, Last 
accessed November 22, 2005.  
9 The devices exploded on July 11, August 10, September 10 and October 14, 2005. 
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Several other affiliated mosques were raided later on November 10th 2005, in an 
apparent government crackdown. During this later raid, weapons, ammunition and 
grenades were seized at the group’s headquarters at Mucurapo, but no explosive materials 
or bombing suspects were found, or charged. It must be noted that Trinidad and Tobago 
also hosts a number of other radical Islamist groups apart from the Jamaat Al 
Muslimeen.10 If the Jamaat is not behind the recent spate of bombings in Port of Spain, 
then the other alternative is more alarming, that is, the mobilization of another group that 
has the capability and the willingness to use explosives and arms to disrupt the security, 
stability and economy of Trinidad and Tobago. 
What these incidents suggest is that there is a wide scale of confirmed and 
suspected terrorist activity taking place in and around Trinidad and Tobago. The inability 
of the local security forces to date to prevent, or arrest, the perpetrators of recent activity 
also alludes to the ease with which local or transnational groups could possibly facilitate 
an attack on the energy sector, in keeping with the terrorist strategy of economic center of 
gravity attack.  
This is important because both the U.S. State Department and U.S. Energy 
Secretary have consistently described energy shipments from Trinidad and Tobago as key 
to the United States’ energy security, economy and ultimate security.11 However, despite 
the apparent increase in terrorist activity and the dependence of the United States on LNG 
supplies from Trinidad and Tobago, the United States State Department has steadfastly 
adhered to its policy to suspend all security aid and training assistance to Trinidad and 
Tobago. In August 2003 the United States curtailed aid to Trinidad and Tobago to place 
pressure on the islands’ government to support the exemption of the United States 
military from prosecution by the International Criminal Court. As of October 2005, the 
 
10 11% of the population in Trinidad is Muslim. “Three Muslim fundamentalist groups in this country 
are kept under constant surveillance, the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force yesterday informed high-
ranking military officials from over a dozen countries. The groups named were the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen, 
the Waajihatul Islaamiyyah, based in Princes Town, and the Jamaat al Murabiteen, which, the Express was 
informed, operates from a Central location.” Ucill Cambridge, “Muslim watch,” Express On line March 
92004. Available from http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_news?id=17332822, Last accessed 
November 21, 2005. 
11 Petroleum World “U.S. Energy Rep: T&T LNG Key,” December 17, 2004. Available from 
Petroleumworld.com http://www.petroleumworld.com/storytt04121708.htm, Last Accessed June 15, 2005. 
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United States offered no security assistance or anti-terrorism funding to Trinidad and 
Tobago.12 This policy, does not appear beneficial to either party in helping to secure vital 
bilateral energy and security interests, yet it still is enforced. Curiously, despite this 
inconsistency and the importance of this issue to both nations, and the region’s economic 
security and stability, there is scant attention in the international relations literature on 
this issue. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to address the gap in the literature with regard to this 
issue and to illustrate the catastrophic effects a significant terrorist attack on Trinidad and 
Tobago’s energy sector will have on the economic and political stability of Trinidad and 
Tobago. Because of Trinidad and Tobago’s dominant economic role in the region, the 
thesis will also discuss the impact of an attack on Trinidad’s ability to continue to 
contribute to regional stability and development. I will also show the possible debilitating 
effects such an attack will have on the U.S. economy, and the implications for security in 
the United States as a result of instability in the “backyard” of the United States. I will 
also provide recommendations to prevent a significant terrorist attack on the energy 
sector in Trinidad and Tobago to mitigate this three-fold threat. Lastly, I will provide 
recommendations to adjust the conflicting bilateral foreign policy related to terrorism, 
drug trafficking and energy security that in combination, inadvertently contributes to 
instability in the “Third Border” as the Bush Administration has aptly named this area.13  
C. OVERVIEW 
The remainder of this thesis is laid out as follows. In Chapter II I provide an 
overview of Trinidad and Tobago’s energy industry. I will also examine the vulnerability 
of the local energy asset infrastructure in Trinidad and Tobago, and develop local attack 
 
12 U.S. Department of State Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations Report, Fiscal 
Year 2006.  
13 In order to better focus the U.S.-Caribbean relationship and work with our partners on a number of 
capacity building tasks, the Bush Administration has developed a “Third Border Initiative.” “We are also 
committed to deepening our cooperation throughout the hemisphere in fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS, 
responding to natural disasters, and making sure the benefits of globalization are felt in even the smallest 
economies. These goals are at the heart of the “Third Border” initiative we have launched with the 
countries of the Caribbean.” President George W. Bush. President of the United States: The White House, 
Washington D.C. April 21, 2001.  
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scenarios that could potentially threaten it, based on recent terrorist activity in the global 
energy sector. In Chapter III  I will look at the threats to the local energy industry with 
specific focus on crime and terrorism. I will also examine the local capacity and 
capability of Trinidad and Tobago’s maritime security services to secure this vital sector. 
In Chapter IV, I provide an estimate of the potential costs of a significant terrorist 
attack on the economy of Trinidad and Tobago. I will also look at Trinidad and Tobago’s 
economic and military role in the region in facilitating and maintaining security and 
stability and the possible impacts an attack could have on the region if these military and 
economic services are significantly reduced or disrupted. The last section of this chapter 
will focus on the impact of an attack on the U.S. economy. 
In Chapter V, I will examine the existing bilateral foreign policy and its effects on 
the general security and stability of Trinidad and Tobago and provide recommendations 
to prevent and mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack on the energy sector. I will also 
provide recommendations for adjustments to ameliorate the negative consequences of 
conflicting U.S. counter-drug, counter-terror and energy security policy. I conclude the 
chapter with recommendations to facilitate stability in the region and to enhance the 
security of bilateral energy interests. 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE AND VULNERABILITY OF TRINIDAD 
AND TOBAGO’S ENERGY SECTOR 
In this chapter I will provide a brief overview of the oil and gas industry’s integral 
role in facilitating the Trinidad and Tobago’s development. I will begin the chapter by 
highlighting the significant U.S. and foreign investment in this sector. I will then outline 
the sector’s critical importance as the main source of the country’s exports, foreign 
earnings and economic development. In the last section, I will show in detail the 
vulnerability of the local energy asset infrastructure to terrorist attack. I will illustrate this 
by analyzing current trends from collected data on recent terrorist attacks on energy 
facilities worldwide, and then apply the methodology to prioritized local attack scenarios. 
A. PROFILE ON THE ENERGY INDUSTRY OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
The energy sector is the mainstay and driving force of the economy of Trinidad 
and Tobago. The reserves of oil and gas held by the country are its most important 
economic assets (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Petroleum Reserves as of January 1, 2004  
 
 Proved Probable Possible 
Crude Oil (MMBO) 756 358 1644 
Natural Gas (Tcf) 18.8 8.6 5.9 
 
Historically, Trinidad and Tobago was a major oil exporter, but gas exports now 
dominate the sector (see Table 2, below). However, revenues from oil sales still 
constitute an important part of the sector’s revenue stream, and production and 
exploration continues.14  
 
 
                                                 
14 Trinidad and Tobago is presently ranked the fifth largest producer of LNG in the world and the 
second largest producer in the Atlantic Basin. Most of the information in this section was provided from the 
Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of Energy official website. Available from 
http://www.energy.gov.tt/applicationloader.asp?app=articles&id=807, Last accessed October 14, 2005. 
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Table 2. Crude Oil and Natural Gas Production, 2000 – 2004 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Crude oil      
Exploration (metres) 33,139 45,910 20,593 28,941 29,063 
Daily Average Production (barrels) 119,354 113,523 130,626 134,089 122,902 
Total Production ('000 barrels) 43,680 41,469 47,824 49,117 44,982 
Imports ('000 barrels) 35,195 30,524 32,241 33,186 22,771 
Exports ('000 barrels) 19,118 18,323 24,895 26,002 20,467 
Natural gas (million cubic feet/day)      
Production 1,498.0 1,596.0 1,826.0 2,594.0 2,938.0 
Utilization 1,255.0 1,304.3 1,771.2 2,325.2 2,640.1 
 of which:      
Petrochemicals 618.5 661.0 693.8 731.1 846.5 
Electricity Generation 186.5 193.3 219.2 230.1 239.4 
LNG 450.0 450.0 858.2 1,364.0 1,415.3 
a Also includes condensates. 
b Utilization refers to gas sales, and does not include natural gas used in own consumption. 
 
Natural gas is not only exported as the main cash crop, but it is also used in the 
development of other highly profitable export products, mainly methanol and fertilizers 
which are highlighted in Table 3, below. Trinidad and Tobago is currently rated as the 
world’s largest producer and supplier of methanol and urea. The government intends to 
expand this export market considerably in the near future with the construction of 
additional ammonia, methanol, and urea plants.  
 
Table 3. Petrochemicals Production and Exports, 2000-04 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Production       
Fertilizers ('000 tonnes) 3,827.5 4,209.0 4,720.5 4,964.7 5,215.8
Methanol ('000 tonnes) 2,480.2 2,788.9 2,828.7 2,845.7 3,067.8
Natural gas liquidsa ('000 barrels) 6,992.8 7,531.3 8,607.6 10,505.1 10,547.8
Exports       
 Fertilizers ('000 tonnes) 3,449.7 3,995.1 4,226.2 4,595.0 4,615.9
 Methanol ('000 tonnes) 2,438.6 2,807.9 2,787.7 2,832.3 3,132.9
 Natural gas liquids ('000 barrels) 6,800.0 7,666.0 8,766.9 10,236.1 10,368.8
Natural gas liquids include propane, butane and natural gasoline. 
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Generally, the oil and gas industry is mainly maritime-based though there is some 
significant land based oil exploration activity in the southern part of the island. Oil and 
gas for local use are produced mainly on the West Coast by local companies (Petrotrin 
and the National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago NGC), while oil and gas for 
export are produced mainly on the East coast by foreign owned British and American 
companies. The main multinational corporations involved in the extraction phase of this 
activity are: 
1. British Petroleum (BPTT): 66.3% total gas production 
2. British Gas: 23.6% of total gas production 
3. EOG Resources: 7.0% of total gas production 
4. The National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago, State owned 
Petrotrin and BHP Billiton: 3.1% 
There are eighty-two major offshore platforms that extend from 1 mile to 44 miles 
off the West and East coasts as highlighted in Table 4. Workers on the East Coast are 
typically ferried to work by helicopter companies contracted by the oil and gas 
companies, while West Coast workers are ferried by company owned launches. 
 
Table 4. Breakdown of Oil and Gas Companies Operating Offshore in Trinidad and 
Tobago (From: Source: South chamber of Industry and Commerce of Trinidad 
and Tobago Official Website. Available from 
http://www.southchamber.org/initiatives/initiative.aspx?CategoryID=1400&id=29
28, Last accessed November 20, 2005. 
 
Company Location Number 
Petrotrin (Trinmar)* West Coast (Pt. Fortin) 32 
Petrotrin South East Coast 4 
Petrotrin Trintomar* West Coast 1 
BPTT South East Coast 22 
Venture West Coast (Brighton) 8 
NGC South East Coast 2 
EOG East Coast 5 
BG North Coast/East Coast 2 
BHP North East Coast 5 
Moraven East Coast 1 
* The different names reflect different subsidiaries of the state owned corporation based in different 
geographic areas. Each one coming into existence at different times depending on the discovery of 




Two main companies carry out the processing or treatment of natural gas for 
export in Trinidad and Tobago. The Atlantic LNG Company of Trinidad and Tobago 
processes the majority of East Coast gas for export to the United States, and it ships these 
exports from its adjacent port facility. BPTT and the National Gas Company of Trinidad 
and Tobago jointly own the Atlantic LNG production facility, located at Pt. Fortin. The 
facility receives about 1.5 Billion cubic feet (Bcf) per day from BPTT and other sources.  
Phoenix Park Gas Processors limited (PPGPL) also exports smaller quantities of 
gas overseas in a strategic alliance with the National Gas Company of Trinidad and 
Tobago. Gas is supplied from the National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago to 
PPGPL for processing from its gas platforms on both coasts, and then it is marketed for 
sale in the region. NGC and Petrotrin are state-owned petroleum companies, which also 
provide a domestic supply of oil and gas. NGC is also responsible for reliable gas service 
to the to the Pt. Lisas industrial estate and power generation utilities that provide power 
for the entire island.  
BPTT recently completed the Cassia B facility. It is one of the world's largest 
offshore gas processing units built in Trinidad by a local company as part of a $500 
million project to supply gas to the ALNG trains. The pipeline to shore has the capacity 
to transport 2 Bcf/d uncompressed gas. BPTT operations are crucial to the island’s 
economy, 60% of BPTT’s gas production goes to Atlantic LNG and 30% to NGC for the 
domestic market. BPTT also holds shares in many of the industrial plants in the Pt. Lisas 
industrial estate.  
The energy sector is regulated and monitored by the Ministry of Energy. This 
ministry is also responsible for the licensing, taxation and the auction and bidding process 
for oil and gas companies that wish to engage in exploration around Trinidad and 
Tobago. Most service industries such as catering, maintenance, transport, and supplies 
are locally owned, and these support industries provide employment to the rural 
communities and remote villages where oil and gas are discovered. Expatriate workers 
work on both coasts, generally on contract as consultants for technical operations, while 
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local labor is used for less skilled jobs. Expatriates generally live in Trinidad for periods 
extending to three years or the duration of the exploratory or construction phases of new 
projects.  
The 2006 round of licensing for exploration and development operations will see 
new operations by a Petrotrin/Exxon Mobil joint venture, Petro Canada, Petro Oil, and 
Norsk Hydro, increasing the number of expatriates working in the islands. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) related to the entrant of new companies is estimated to be $100 billion 
dollars over the next ten years based on positive results from these exploratory wells, but 
they are dependent on a stable investment climate. 
Apart for foreign investment, the government is presently working on finalizing 
several projects which all will be powered or supplied in some way from the natural gas 
industry. These projects include upgrading and expanding the 160,000-bbl/d refinery at 
Pointe-a-Pierre, which refines oil from Latin America (Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil) 
and West Africa, and the construction of downstream ammonia and methanol plants to 
produce urea, ammonium nitrate and melamine. Other construction projects include an 
aluminum smelter, a new ethane based petrochemical complex, a gas refinery, a gas-to-
liquids facility, and an ethanol plant all based on the southwest coast. Another industrial 
port is also envisaged in La Brea and another industrial area similar to Pt. Lisas is being 
planned for Union Estate on the south coast for additional ammonia, urea, methanol 
production and related industries.  
In summary Trinidad and Tobago’s energy sector provides the majority of 
revenue to government and drives economic growth in the island. This sector provides 
the resources that are the top earning exports for Trinidad and Tobago and the sector also 
was the main generating force of FDI in the islands and several new projects are planned 
to further develop the islands’ industrial base and capture new foreign investment.  
In 2004, this sector contributed approximately 34.1% to the country’s GDP, 
85.5% to merchandise exports, 70% of foreign exchange earnings and 37.1% to 
government  
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revenues. Current U.S. FDI flows in the island are estimated at $600 Million USD per 
annum. In the following section, we will see just how vulnerable this crucial sector is to 
terrorist attack. 
B. VULNERABILITY OF LOCAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE 
The local energy asset infrastructure in Trinidad needs to be better secured. The 
fact that Al Qaeda and related transnational groups are targeting oil and gas targets, 
points to a calculated strategy to attack less secured areas and softer industrial targets. 
This means that the burden of security is going to fall more and more on the private 
(security) sector which does not have the wherewithal and experience to provide security 
responses to military type attacks.  
Moreover, many of these multinational oil and gas extraction corporations have 
safety policies forbidding firearms on their compounds and corporate regimens. This 
rejects security restrictions and additional security costs in the absence of robust 
intelligence of an imminent threat. This is mainly because increased security and 
restricted operations represents reduced production and increased costs.15 This is a 
dilemma because military forces are not in the habit of making intelligence available to 
the business community.  
While local companies have employed many ex-Trinidad and Tobago Defense 
force personnel as their security advisors (BPTT and BGTT), the focus is on loss 
prevention and industrial petty crime.16 Contracted security companies that employ local 
civilians handle security issues and they are not trained or versed in marine emergency  
 
 
15 This information was taken from the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force’s National energy assets 
protection program. (NEAP) This was an eight-month study by a Defence Force team on the island’s 
energy infrastructure hardness to terrorist attack. 
16 Based on the NEAP survey reports.  
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management and response.17 Most administrative facilities are built to civilian standards 
and do not possess the now standard anti-terror building innovations (e.g. car parking 
restrictions and blast proof windows).  
The implementation of the International Ships and Port Security code as part of 
the U.S. Patriot (maritime security) Act has meant increased security, awareness and 
checks at port facilities generally. Local legislation patterned on the act placed 
obligations on local operators to increase security. Each facility must submit a security 
plan that must then be approved by the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard, which has 
been made the designated security authority. These plans must contain drills to be 
conducted over specific periods by a designated security officer. The offshore platforms 
continue to be at risk, however because the local act does not apply to offshore 
platforms.18
C. CRITICAL AREAS 
There are five critical areas within the Trinidad and Tobago Energy Asset 
Infrastructure: the Phoenix Park gas transfer valve station, the Atlantic LNG gas 
processing and loading facility, the Phoenix Park gas processing facility at Pt. Lisas, 
BPTT/NGC Teak A and Cassia (East Coast) central processing platforms, and Petrotrin’s 
platforms (West Coast) No. 12 and 15.19
The Phoenix Park Gas transfer station receives all the natural gas from offshore 
and is the terminus that provides supply to Atlantic LNG in the south, and Phoenix Park 
Gas processors within the Pt. Lisas industrial complex. These in turn supply the power 
generation company of Trinidad and Tobago (Powergen) with treated or sweet gas. 
Powergen supplies electricity to all of the industries located in the Pt. Lisas industrial 
 
17 “Private owners and operators of infrastructure, facilities, and resources are the first line of defense 
for their own property, and they should undertake basic facility security improvements. They can improve 
their defenses against terrorist attacks and criminal acts by embedding into their business practices scalable 
security measures that reduce systemic or physical vulnerabilities. The elimination of security weaknesses 
depends upon incorporating best practices and establishing centers of excellence, including feedback loops 
for lessons learned, as well as a periodic review of each country's security standards for mutual 
compatibility.” The National Maritime Strategy of the United States Washington: The White House, March 
8, 2005, sec. iv, p. 18. 
18 The intent of the act was to secure cargo vessels that enter U.S. waters and ports that trade with the 
United States. Offshore platforms are obviously meant to be stationary and do not fall within the code. 
19 See Figure 1. 
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complex and the entire island. Phoenix Park Gas transfer station is the central node in the 
natural gas and power network, and, presently, it is inadequately secured with just a ten-
foot fence, and padlocked gate. There is no manned security, no surveillance cameras, 
and the facility is isolated in the middle of an open field. Should this facility be taken out 
all East Coast gas will be cut off from the island.20 I argue that this facility should be 
much better secured and encased by a concrete mantle able to withstand rocket propelled 
grenade (RPG type) attacks to safeguard the country’s industrial base and electricity 
supply. 
The Atlantic LNG facility at Pt. Fortin is the only one of its kind in Trinidad and 
Tobago in terms of size, capacity and storage. The majority of the LNG tankers bound for 
the United States are loaded at Atlantic LNG. It is critical because, should this facility be 
taken out of operation for even a few days, the result would be significant losses to both 
Trinidad and Tobago and the United States natural gas supply network in lost revenue. 
Atlantic LNG is secured by two civilian contract firms, but possesses no marine patrol 
force to secure its harbor area.21 The gas transfer couplings that are located on the jetty to 
fill ships with LNG are intricately fabricated devices that are imported from overseas. 
They cost in the vicinity of 10 million USD, are delicate, difficult to fabricate, and 
require a minimum of six to twelve weeks for delivery, should they need to be replaced.22 
The effect of destroying these devices alone, or damaging them, which can be achieved 
by an RPG type attack from the sea, can put the entire facility at a standstill. Atlantic’s 





20 The National Gas Company is working feverishly to complete a 56 inch and another 21 inch bypass 
lines across the country to reduce this risk. These bypass lines are expected to be completed within the next 
three years. National Gas Company of Trinidad and Tobago Limited. “Profile on the National Gas 
Company of Trinidad and Tobago Limited.” Available from 
http://www.ngc.co.tt/About_NGC/CorporateProfile/Default.asp?section=2, Last accessed September 28, 
2005. 
21 Two ex-Defense force personnel working its Marine department and are well versed in maritime 
security.  
22 NEAP Study. 
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processing plant and this prestige would make it an attractive terrorist target in itself. The 
fact that this facility lies on the coast signifies that more attention should be paid to 
maritime domain security awareness.23
Phoenix Park Gas Processors plant at Pt. Lisas is also critical because its main 
function is to process the gas for use by the other industrial facilities at the Pt. Lisas 
industrial complex and to provide “sweet” processed gas to the Power Generation 
Company of Trinidad and Tobago. Without processed or sweet gas (less impurities) the 
gas turbines would be prone to less efficiency and breakdowns, if they are allowed to be 
run at all with crude gas. 
Teak A (booster) and Cassia are the most important offshore platforms (on the 
East Coast) because they are the central node from which natural gas is pumped from 
other producing platforms for transmission ashore. BPTT is also the largest producer of 
gas so this makes the facility critical. If the central gas station is taken out then the gas 
cannot get ashore until another pumping station can be connected to the various wells. 
This is not an easy undertaking in rough maritime conditions, and this reconnection 
would have to be done on the sea bed, which, in some cases, is miles below. Petrotrin’s 
Platform No. 15 is the central node on the west Coast and would be affected in the same 
way as Teak A.  
 
23 “Preventing unlawful or hostile exploitation of the maritime domain requires that nations 
collectively improve their capability to monitor activity throughout the domain, establish responsive 
decision-making architectures, enhance maritime interdiction capacity, develop effective policing 
protocols, and build intergovernmental cooperation.” The National Maritime Strategy of the United States, 
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In summary, I argue that general security should be improved across the industry, 
but special emphasis should be placed on the critical areas. For these exceptions, safety 
rules concerning firearms should be reconsidered. If costs are of concern then priority 
spending on security should be placed on these areas. While administrative offices are 
reasonably guarded by contract security, offshore platforms are highly vulnerable to 
airborne and sea-borne attacks. The following section highlights specific areas that need 
to be addressed based on information gained from the TTDF’s National Energy Assets 
protection team surveys.  
D. PLATFORM SECURITY 
The energy industry is heavily focused on safety and this sometimes works at 
cross-purposes with security and hampers security in many ways. No lock policies for 
compartments on platforms, including the control room and sleeping quarters (due to fire 
safety regulations) make most areas on platforms highly accessible. This should be 
reconsidered. Although most of the platforms are fitted with camera systems, these are 
usually trained on production processes to be able to quickly detect accidents and not on 
maritime domain awareness or security. These cameras could be effective in promoting 
maritime domain awareness but they not sited properly to do this. Minor adjustment to 
increase pan angles could greatly enhance security particularly at night. 
The majority of platforms have permanent vessel landing facilities that are welded 
on. These allow easy access by anyone who wishes to gain entry to the platform once the 
sea state permits. This has been the source of weekly complaints by the platform workers, 
because fishing vessels routinely tie up on the platforms to fish. Their presence, 
especially when unknown to workers at night, presents a safety hazard (from discarded or 
dropped items) and their lines entangle the piping systems. Their presence also causes 
anxiety for platform crews when discovered, who hope they have only good intentions. 
This is because there is a no firearm policy on platforms, due to potential ignition of 
residual gas via muzzle flash or stray bullet impact in the production environment. This 
means the crews have little to defend themselves, and this is another policy area that 
should be reconsidered. 
 18
Emergency shutdown buttons (and automatic assembly response regimens once 
the button is pressed) are situated at all levels of the platform. This means a terrorist 
simply has to gain entry to the platform, press a button, and the platform will shut down 
and all the crew will assemble at emergency points for easy capture. These buttons 
should be situated with security more in mind. 
Presently no background checks are required for offshore workers, but a safety-
training certificate is mandatory. This emphasizes the focus on safety and not security. 
This means that anyone who is qualified and has a safety certificate can gain entry to a 
platform through any one of the number of various contract services that supply human 
resource to the oil fields. This means that the information highlighted above can become 
easily known to those affiliated with workers in the sector, or someone who gains 
temporary employment in the sector with the intention of learning about the platforms or 
staging an attack. In this regard a background check system should be implemented at 
least for critical platforms.  
Two main Heliports, National Helicopter Services Limited (NHSL) at Chaguanas, 
and Bristow International at Point Galeota, ferry workers to the various platforms daily 
There is also minimal contract security at these facilities. They are secured by private 
security and are vulnerable to a military type takeover. Armed personnel can also hijack a 
helicopter to land and takeover a platform or crash into it, via a suicide attack. The 
Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force does not possess any armed interceptor aircraft 
(fixed wing or rotor) so there is little that can be done to stop a hijacked aircraft over the 
twenty minute flight (on average) from the heliports to the oil fields. These facilities need 
to be better secured and, most important, there should be an awareness of the potential 
effects of the seizure of a helicopter by the parties that contract and operate them.. 
In summary, the local energy industry as a whole must become more security 
conscious and accept the tradeoffs of increased costs and enhanced security by 
compromising some aspects of its safety regime. Policies must be balanced in order for 
the right mix of security and safety to be implemented in a cost effective manner, to 
ensure these vitals platforms are not lost from either accident or through malevolent 
action. Either alternative will lead to large-scale losses for the company and country. 
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E. METHODS OF ATTACK 
There are several methods of terrorist attack, which run the gamut from sabotage 
to aircraft attacks on critical infrastructure. By analyzing the trends from recent attacks 
around the world, we can derive a prioritized threat matrix particular to Trinidad and 
Tobago. 
Using the data from Appendices A (Attacks on the Iraqi Petroleum Industry) and 
B (International Attacks on Energy Infrastructure 2000 to 2005) we can say generally that 
terrorists have increasingly targeted oil facilities and particularly in the case of Iraq in 
keeping with Al Qaeda’s grand strategy. Oil and gas infrastructures are connected 
systems, and the situation in Iraq shows that small scale, inexpensive attacks at one point 
can have larger disruptive effects throughout the system. The most common attack 
scenario observed in the data is an IED attack in a remote area. Large equipment and 
huge geographic expanses of expensive infrastructure cannot be easily relocated and 
secured, and thus the security of these vast systems of infrastructure is highly labor-
intensive, making them subject to repeated attacks. 
Apart from physical attacks on infrastructure and facilities, terrorists targeted 
personnel and repair crews sent in the aftermath of attacks. In the majority of cases, 
repairs to attacked pipelines took between one week and three months to effect and 
operations appeared to continue despite attacks. 
The kidnapping of foreign nationals (expatriate workers) also appears to be a 
common scenario. Looking at the data, we can also say that attacks can be foiled by the 
presence of alert, armed, security services (as is the case in several instances when 
security was vigilant). Based on these observations the following Table highlights the 
application of these threats to Trinidad and Tobago’s energy sector. The threats that have 




Table 5. Local Threat Scenarios24 
 









Bombing High High Atlantic LNG, Pt. Lisas, PPGL 
jetty are the three areas with 
gas transfer coupling gantries, 
each valued at 10 million USD 
Mitigation approach: Maritime 
domain awareness and law 
enforcement patrol







Low High If attack is precise on coupling 
and during nighttime, off-peak 
hours, deaths will be low. 
Mitigation approach: 
intelligence, contract security 
vigilance, law enforcement 
patrol







High High If LNG can be ignited this may 
cause a blast radius of up to 500 
meters 
Mitigation approach: 
intelligence, contract security 







Medium  Daily 
transactions 
Actual costs are hard to assess 
due to daily variance in 
commercial activity. Production 
itself would not stop. 
Mitigation approach: contract 






Low-Medium Low Severance, benefits, increased 
security. Mitigation approach 
contract security awareness and 
vigilance
Offshore platform Sabotage of 
production 
machinery 
Minimal Production  Daily production loss, 
replacement costs, increased 
security and investigation costs. 
Mitigation approach: Maritime 
domain awareness and law 
enforcement patrol
Offshore platform Sabotage Low Low Discovery of sabotage would 
result in evacuation of the 
platform and daily production 
losses until situation is rectified 
and investigated  
                                                 
24 NEAP unclassified data. 
 21





Offshore platform Ramming by 
vessel 
Low Low Most probable damage will be 
to piping system Mitigation 
approach: Maritime domain 
awareness and law enforcement 
patrol




High High Catastrophic loss with 
environmental impact. 
Mitigation approach: 
Intelligence, Maritime domain 






Low Low This could be catastrophic if 
diesel storage facility on 
platform is hit. Improbable if 
vessel is used as weapons 
platform in rough water. 
Mitigation approach: Maritime 
domain awareness and law 
enforcement patrol
Offshore platform Hijacking Low Medium Depending on length of stand 
off, but platform can be shut 
down from ashore to minimize 
production risk and 
environmental impact 
Offshore platform Bombing of 
platform 





Offshore platform Suicide aircraft 
Attack 
High High Loss of aircraft crew and 
platform crew. Most probable 











Low High No loss of life but is critical to 
Trinidad and Tobago industry 
Mitigation approach: hardening 
of site
*Average number of persons working in administrative offices = 120 
Average number of workers per platform overnight: 15, during the day: 35. 
Key:  Costs: high = over 20 million USD, medium = over 10 million USD, low = under 5 million USD 
Deaths are high when over 100 persons are killed, medium over 20 persons, low less than 10 
persons. 
 
In conclusion, extrapolating from the Table the attack scenarios posing the highest 
costs and the most damage are attacks on the offshore platforms. These can be mitigated 
by increased presence of law enforcement/military patrol in the offshore operations 
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sector, maritime domain awareness, and vigilant production crews versed in security 
training. A credible and capable deterrent/response mechanism in force and an effective 
intelligence system also appear to be essential in mitigating these threats. 
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III. THREATS TO TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO’S ENERGY 
SECTOR 
Small islands struggle with overlapping security problems of the twenty–first 
century; where the delimitation between internal and external threats are blurred, when 
national and international issues are intrinsically linked and more than ever traditional 
civil military structures seem inadequate. Drug trafficking, crime, and terrorism all 
present complex threats to the energy sector and they require proactive responses and 
hybrid structures in response. Trinidad and Tobago is presently grappling with a myriad 
of maritime-based threats and the Government is rapidly trying to transform its military 
and para-military forces to meet the challenge. In this chapter, I will examine two of the 
main threats to the local energy sector: rising crime, brought about by increased 
smuggling activity around Trinidad and Tobago, and, the potential for maritime 
terrorism. The current operational state of the local maritime security apparatus to 
counter these threats will also be examined.  
A. THE LOCAL CRIME SITUATION 
Crime in Trinidad has become a significant problem. This situation, apart from 
any terrorist threats to the energy sector, can adversely affect the energy sector by 
deterring future investment and by causing the reduction of activity or pull out of the oil 
and gas companies operating in Trinidad and Tobago. There are several other countries 
developing LNG extraction and processing capabilities,25 and crime has the potential to 
make operations in Trinidad relatively more risky and costly26 compared to these other 
areas for potential investment by transnational corporations. Trinidad’s main comparative 
advantages in the rapidly developing LNG industry are its relatively cheaper costs per 
supply of BTU of gas27 and its relative stability. This is rapidly being challenged due to 
 
25 Brunei, Indonesia, Oman, Australia, Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, United Arab Emirates, and Malaysia 
are all developing LNG extraction and production plants, however most of them will not be on line for 
many years. Henry Lee, “Dawning of a New Era: The LNG Story,” Environment and Natural Resources 
Program (ENRP) Discussion Paper 2005-07, John F. Kennedy School of Government. Cambridge, MA: 
April 2005.  
26 This is due to additional security and insurance costs, and deteriorating investor confidence caused 
by crime in comparison to other sources of gas. 
27 See Table 15, Chapter IV, p. 80. 
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the unprecedented increase in crime. Foreign oil companies always have the option of 
moving to areas with less risk. The following is an extract from the daily newspaper 
highlighting the increase in crime: 
Last month was the most violent and bloodiest in the nation’s history with 
40 murders in 30 days. Homicide Bureau figures show Detectives say, 
based on the figures the country has never experienced ‘such 
unprecedented violence before even when compared to July 1990 when 
the attempted coup by the Jamaat Al Muslimeen took place.’ Homicide 
officers say the nation can ‘easily expect’ close to 370 murders this year if 
the pattern continues. Official Homicide Bureau figures put the reported 
murder toll as of yesterday at 287, an almost 43% increase in murders 
when compared with last year. The number of people killed per 1000 
citizens has also risen sharply (as of 14 October 2005), placing Trinidad 
and Tobago in the top 12 in the world based on its homicide rate per 1000 
persons. In the last three years, Trinidad’s murder rate has snowballed by 
almost 70% and close to 70% percent of those murders are committed 
with firearms.28  
The local situation has been compared to Colombia in terms of the frequency of 
kidnapping, (see Table 6) and it is one that needs to be addressed. There were 142 
kidnapping for ransom in 2003, 96 in 2004, and to date 189 in 2005 to date. The local 
murder rate has also doubled in less than five years (see Table 6). 
 
28 Darryl Heeralal, “Killer Month: September Bloodiest on Record-40 Slain in 30 Days,” Trinidad 
Express Online October 3, 2005. Available from 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=105808757, Last accessed October 15, 2005. 
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Table 6. The Number of Murders in Trinidad and Tobago and Trinidad and 
Tobago’s Ranking in Murders per 1000 Persons Globally (From: Homicide 
Bureau Trinidad and Tobago Police. Data for Extrapolated Murder Rate Ranking 
Obtained from Nation Master.com. Available from. 
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph-T/cri_mur_cap. Last accessed October 15, 
2005 
 
 Total Murders 
committed in Trinidad 
and Tobago (T&T) 
 Current World ranking, 
Murders 
Murders per 1000 person 
2005 334 as of 10/18/05  Colombia  0.61 
2004 260  South Africa  0.49 
2003 229  Jamaica  0.32 
2002 171  Venezuela  0.31 
2001 151  T&T  0.23 
2000 118  Russia  0.20 
1999 93  Mexico  0.13 
1998 98  Estonia 0.10 
1997 101  Latvia  0.10 
1996 106  Lithuania  0.10 
1995 122  Belarus  0.09 
 
The following statement by the local American chamber of commerce highlights 
the level of fear in the country at present and its possible negative effect on the country’s 
energy industry.  
Am Cham believes that, in regards to the continually escalating crime situation, 
the future of this country is being put at risk, and has created an environment of 
uncertainty, which will have significant negative impact on both investment and 
consumption levels. It also mirrors a serious societal sickness, which is eating away at the 
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well being, the psyche, the very lives and livelihoods of every citizen of our country. The 
reality of crime also affects our ex-pat and tourist communities.29  
In his 2006 National Budget presentation, the Honorable Patrick Manning, Prime 
Minister of Trinidad and Tobago also stated  
Mr. Speaker, the escalation of violent crime and anti-social behavior 
constitute the most fundamental threat to the economic and social 
development of our country and the well being of our people…Any 
effective strategy to control crime must be based on the fullest 
understanding of the dimension of the problem. Trinidad and Tobago and 
other islands of the Caribbean are located directly between the major 
cocaine producers of South America and the major consumers of North 
America and Western Europe. The recent seizure of nearly six tons of 
cocaine in our territorial waters has been described by our international 
partners in the fight against drug trafficking as possibly less than 10 
percent of the amount being transshipped through our waters. The 
proceeds from this trade are also used to finance the procurement of illegal 
arms and as a result, sophisticated arsenals end up in the hands of 
competing gangs, which in turn fuel the murder rate. Over time other 
criminal activities emerge, the most sinister is kidnapping. There can be 
no doubt as to the debilitating effect of kidnapping on the law abiding 
majority, the fear and anxiety it creates and the extent to which it 
contributes to the perception that our country is not safe. Within this 
context, therefore, crime, although manifested nationally, is coordinated 
and directed, both locally and internationally. Accordingly solutions must 
go beyond the community and national borders to regional and 
international cooperation. The corruption, intimidation and violence go 
hand in hand with organized crime, undermine law and order and threaten 
the very essence of democratic governance.30
The communities in Trinidad and Tobago that record the highest level of criminal 
activity have been the most impoverished areas since the 1970’s oil boom, and continue 
to be so five years into the present gas boom.31 Many of the government’s methods of 
 
29 The American Chamber of Commerce of Trinidad and Tobago. Statement on Current Crime 
Situation, April 20, 2005. When compared with the United Kingdom, which has a population of 60 million 
but a murder rate of just under 1 per 100,000, the conclusions are indeed alarming. 
30 2006 National Budget presentation by the Honorable Patrick Manning Prime Minister of Trinidad 
and Tobago, House of representatives, The Red House, Port of Spain, September 28, 2005. 
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social delivery and attempts at sharing the wealth routinely become criminalized by the 
underprivileged. The Government’s Urban Relief and Community Environmental 
Protection Employment Programs, (temporary road works and environmental and 
conservation construction programs in depressed areas) have been infiltrated by gangs 
and leadership positions taken by members of the Jamaat Al Muslimeen.32 In order to 
gain legitimacy and power the JAM has found a way of gaining entry into the local 
political scene by immersing itself in the intricate dealings of the criminal underworld. 
The JAM has promoted itself as a power broker between the government and the 
underworld, and has implied it can control the various “crime bosses” in depressed areas 
where crime is rampant. Employees of these programs are featured weekly in obituaries 
as a result of gang warfare. Government housing projects and the Port of Spain’s 
overhanging Laventille area have become overwhelmed by gang violence, murder and 
violent competition for short-term jobs, and the proceeds of criminal enterprise. 
According to the Minister of National Security, almost sixty percent of the homicides 
reported are gang related, many are also related to government contract competition in 
depressed areas.33 The increased level of criminal activity has resulted in the issue of 
several negative travel advisories posted by the British and U.S. governments, warning 
visitors and expatriate workers about the crime situation in Trinidad and Tobago. Crime 
 
31 One police district in Laventille has accounted for over one-fifth of the country's 311 murders. The 
Besson Street (Laventille) police district, one of the more than 60 districts throughout the country, has 
recorded 72 murders for the year. There has already been a 15 per cent increase in murders in that district 
with 58 homicides last year, Darryl Heeralal “POS teen killed on birthday,” Trinidad Express November 1, 
2005. Available from http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_news?id=112581947, Last accessed 
November 18, 2005. 
32 A few days ago a young man before the court, asked about the nature of his employment answered, 
honestly enough, that he did not work but was in the habit of getting URP checks. That is but one of the 
negative consequences of public works programs in this country, however well-meaning the intention of 
the various administrations. Also, to our increasing alarm, the corruption bar continues to be raised in that, 
whatever the connivance of insiders, outsiders in the form of criminals who organize themselves precisely 
for the purpose keep muscling in on the programmes Trinidad and Tobago Express Newspapers: Editorial: 
“URP Clean Up an Urgent Matter,” April 29, 2005. Available from 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=75054962, Last accessed November 18, 2005. 
33 “Many of these communities are unplanned, which makes them generally inaccessible, but they are 
close enough to the commercial centers to provide cover for kidnappers and extortionists. The criminal elite 
also finances the acquisition of sophisticated arsenals, which, in the hands of criminal gangs, fuel the 
murder rate and expand the range of criminal enterprises to include kidnapping and extortion.” Statement 
of the Honorable Minister of National Security Martin Joseph. Shirley Bahadur, “Joseph committed to 
crime fight,” Trinidad Guardian Online, October 12, 2005. Available from 
http://www.guardian.co.tt/archives/2005-10-14/news16.html, Last accessed November 21, 2005.  
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reduces the perception of national security and stability in the island and has the power to 
destroy the positive investment climate of the country34 and this has to be dealt with 
expeditiously. 
B. TERRORIST THREAT 
In the following section, evidence will be presented to show that Trinidad and 
Tobago is vulnerable to terrorist attack. I will present evidence, which shows that the 
island hosts a numbers of fundamental Islamic groups who are anti-American, generally 
support the Islamic struggle in the Middle East, promote the use of armed struggle to 
establish Islamic states and thus present a danger to the country’s energy sector.  
Dr. Angel Rabasa, a terrorism expert from the RAND organization in Washington 
D.C., stated that Trinidad and Tobago was highly vulnerable to becoming a host to 
terrorist networks and called on the security services to pay close attention to mosques in 
the country.35  
In this regard, the growth of radical Islamic groups in Trinidad both Islamist (co-
option of the organs and resources of the state under Islamic rule) and Islamic Salafist 
(anti-modernism) must be a matter of concern to the national security authorities. Islamist 
movements like the Jamaat Al Muslimeen seek to take the reigns of power for the 
development of Islamic people within the island. The Salafists like the Waajihatul 
Islaamiyyah wish to expel U.S. influence in the country and attack the symbols and tools 
driving modernity and development in Trinidad in order to return to a traditional Islamic 
civilization (similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan).  
 
34 Crime is a major challenge affecting both foreign and local investment, said Wayne Dass, head, 
Group Investment and Management Unit at Caribbean Money Market Brokers (CMMB). Dass was 
speaking at a luncheon yesterday hosted by CMMB and Bear Stearns Company, a financial company based 
in the United States, for executives in the financial services. In giving his analysis for the economic outlook 
for Trinidad and Tobago in the next financial year, Dass said, “We are looking at robust growth, 
strengthening of external policies, small budget surplus resulting, a large non-oil deficit, rising interest rates 
and a violent crime spiral.” Skilled people are leaving the country and this will only continue with the 
current crime rate,” the financial expert said. Dr Carl Ross, head of Emerging Markets Sovereign Research 
at Bear Stearns said rampant crime in Trinidad and Tobago and across the Caribbean is a deterrent to 
investors to bring their businesses to the country and region. Trinidad and Tobago Express Newspapers, 
“Crime Affecting Investments” November 18, 2005 Available from 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=117036265. Last accessed November 18, 2005. 
35 Corey Connelly, “Trinidad Ripe for Terrorist Attack,” Trinidad Guardian On Line, April 29, 2004 
Available from http://www.guardian.co.tt/archives/2004-04-29/news2.html. Last accessed November 18, 
2005. 
 29
                                                
Umar Abdullah, leader of the Princess Town (a city in Trinidad) based Waajihatul 
Islaamiyyah stated, in response to Dr. Rabasa’s reported comments, “We view this as yet 
another sorry and sick effort by the U.S. government to encourage our security forces to 
target and oppress Muslims in this country…we must warn that one must be careful in 
making such comments or statements as it could only be met with serious consequences.” 
Umar Abdullah is a veteran of the battlefields of Afghanistan and has openly admitted 
support to Al Qaeda. Mr. Abdullah who has since disappeared from the national scene is 
believed to be behind the threats to U.S. and British interests in Trinidad and Tobago, in 
2003.36
Berry37 argues that there is a connection between the Al Qaeda network and local 
groups and cells operating in the Northern Coastal areas of Venezuela and Margarita, (80 
miles west of Trinidad), an island off the North coast of Venezuela. Venezuela is 
Trinidad and Tobago’s closest neighbour and just seven miles separate the two countries. 
Trinidad’s larger Muslim population has already spawned violent radical groups; and this 
potential link and threat cannot be disregarded. This proximate activity could make it 
easy for members of the Jamaat Al Muslimeen to travel to Venezuela possibly for 
funding and support towards achieving their aim of establishing an Islamic state in 
Trinidad and Tobago.38  
Olive Enyahooma-El, a high-ranking member of the Jamaat Al Muslimeen and a 
key lieutenant of the group’s leader Yasin Abu Bakr was extradited in early 2005 and is 
presently imprisoned in the United States on gun running charges. ATF agents in Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida39 seized a shipment to Enyahooma-El in 2001 which contained 60 
AK 47 assault rifles, and 10 Mac 10 sub machine guns. The funds associated with the 
transaction were traced by the ATF through Bahrain, Luxembourg, Connecticut and back 
to the Jamaat Al Muslimeen headquarters at No.1 Mucurapo Road, Port of Spain. The 
 
36 Waajihatul Islaamiyyah has strong and publicly acknowledged links to the Jamaat Al Muslimeen, 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Prior Beharry: Trinidad Express, April 30, 2004. 
37 La Verle Berry et al., “Global Overview of Narcotics, Terrorists and Other Extremist Groups.” 
Washington: Library of Congress 2002. 
38 As highlighted earlier economic attacks are a known strategy of Al Qaeda affiliated groups. 
39 Camini Marajh, “U.S. on Jamaat Trail.” Trinidad Express, August 15, 2004. Available form 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=3362003, Last accessed November 18, 2005. 
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FBI and ATF presently have a member of the Jamaat AL Muslimeen in custody in the 
United States Federal Witness Protection program, in connection with this arms 
shipment. The witness has indicated that the Jamaat Al Muslimeen is engaged in narco-
trafficking as one its primary means of funding.40 He also indicated that secondary 
sources of funding for the JAM in the past have included sales of weapons to narcotics 
traffickers, violent co-option of rival narco-trafficking organizations, contracted murder, 
extortion, and kidnapping. Indeed payment for the weapons in question was made in part 
with quantities of cocaine, and U.S. officials are tracking other related sources of 
laundered money.41  
Trinidad has recently experienced a series of unclaimed terrorist bombings in its 
capital Port of Spain. Improvised explosive devices were exploded on the busy streets of 
its shopping district on July 11, 2005, and again on August 10, 2005. Sixteen people were 
injured including a 67 year old woman who suffered amputation of her right leg. Two 
more bombs exploded on September 10, 2005 and October 14, 2005, in a U.S. franchised 
fast food outlet (Kentucky Fried Chicken in Independence square) and a popular local bar 
and a further ten people were injured. The Jamaat compound was raided by a joint 
army/police unit soon after the last bombing on October 11, 2005. During this raid, Abu 
Bakr was arrested as well as four other members of the Muslimeen, for questioning in 
connection with the blast but they were all subsequently released. Samples of their 
clothing were taken to compare with debris from the blast scene, and these have sent to 
domestic and U.S. FBI crime labs for chemical testing. Results from these tests are yet to 
be released.  
Based on the Government efforts to detain Abu Bakr and other members of the 
Jamaat after the last blast, and the recent thorough search for explosives at the compound 
and at other residences of members of the Jamaat, it is reasonable to deduce that the 
government is working on classified intelligence which leads it to believe that Abu Bakr 
may be behind the bombing campaign. On the 7th of November, 2005 Abu Bakr was 
arrested again but this time he was charged for seditious comments he made during a 
 
40 Camini Marajh. 
41 Ibid. 
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Juma42 at the Jamaat on November 4, 2005. On November 11, 2005, the Trinidad and 
Tobago Army and elements of the Police took over the Jamaat compound and, using a 
backhoe, broke down the walls to Abu Bakr’s office and dug a large hole beneath it in a 
search for weapons based on intelligence. A sniper rifle, a hand grenade, communications 
equipment and five hundred and ninety six rounds of assorted ammunition were found on 
the compound and Abu Bakr was charged jointly with two members of the Jamaat al 
Muslimeen for possession of arms, ammunition and the grenade,43 although he was in 
custody at the time.44 Eight other mosques affiliated wit the Jamaat were simultaneously 
raided but no other arms or ammunition were seized. While the raid and search was going 
on at the Jamaat, members barred from entering the compound prostrated themselves in 
front of the media in prayer and anger. The Jamaat’s deputy leader Kala Akibua was 
quoted as saying “Government has declared war on the Muslimeen,” to which the 
prostrated members replied “We can’t get no peace, you can’t get no peace.”45  
The court testimony and other purely unclassified information presented above 
shows that the JAM has been linked to maritime-based drugs and arm trafficking, which 
contribute to the high crime levels. I argue that this presents a threat to the local energy 
sector in terms of reducing investor confidence. In my opinion, this alone should make 
the legal prosecution and dissolution of this group a priority of the government 
Moreover, Abu Bakr is presently being held on seven different charges, pertaining 
to sedition, weapons and arms possession, and threatening with menaces. I argue that if 
Mr. Bakr perceives that his chances of an acquittal in his various upcoming trials, are 
declining, he could initiate counter action in a slash and burn policy or retaliation. This 
 
42 “Bakr, 64, who had allegedly said at last Friday's Eid celebration at the Mucurapo Road mosque that 
a war will be waged if Muslims did not pay zakaat or Islamic alms to his jamaat next year, was taken from 
his Diego Martin home around midnight Monday and was at CID until his court appearance yesterday.” 
Hayden Mills “No Bail for Bakr,” November 11, 2005. Trinidad Express. Available from 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_news?id=115048530, Last accessed November 18, 2005.  
43 Hayden Mills “Army Takes over Jamaat, ‘Trinidad Express November 11, 2005. Available from 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_news?id=115048533, Last accessed November 18, 2005. 
44 Despite the search at the Jamaat compound and the previous detention of members of the JAM for 
questioning, and evidence collection, no one has been indicted or charged for the bombings, nor have any 
explosive materials been seized. 
45 Ibid. and Carl Motroo “Gov’t Has Declared War,” Trinidad Guardian Online, November 11, 2005. 
Available from http://www.trinidadandtobagonews.com/forum/webbbs_config.pl/read/3279, Last accessed 
November 18, 2005.  
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theory is supported by the recent arrest of a member of the Jamaat Al Muslimeen on 
Friday, November 18, 2005. During the search of his premises prior to his arrest, an 
alleged hit list, containing the names of the state’s legal team charged with indicting and 
prosecuting Abu Bakr, including pictures and payment amounts, was discovered.46 This 
provides clear evidence that members of the group may view violence as an option to 
retaliate against the state for targeting the group’s leader, or as a means of securing his 
release. Bakr is widely known and has maintained personal relationships with the leaders 
of many “liberation” groups in the Middle East and the Jamaat Al Muslimeen subsisted 
on training and financial support from these Middle Eastern47 benefactors and mentors in 
its early years.48 I argue that it is reasonable to expect that these benefactors may be 
approached by the group for assistance, monetary or otherwise, to gain his release.  
Taken together with Abu Bakr’s recent public statements concerning his 
disapproval of the use of the funds generated in the energy sector and its importance to 
both Trinidad and the United States49 this group should be closely monitored. The energy 
sector should also be heavily secured to remove it as an option for attack, as a means of 
coercion for Bakr’s release. Bearing in mind Abu Bakr’s international connections in the 
 
46 The five names on the list are Attorney General John Jeremie, Chief Magistrate Sherman 
McNicolls, head of the Central Authority Unit David West, Douglas Mendes SC and Independent Senator 
Dana Seetahal. Newspaper photographs of the five were cut out, pasted on cardboard and next to each 
picture was a cash figure, Jeremie $600,000, McNicolls $300,000, Mendes $500,000, Seetahal, $270,000 
and West $258,000. The five were instrumental in the extradition of Small and with the exception of West 
the prosecution of Jamaat leader Imam Yasin Abu Bakr on sedition and arms charges. Police found the list 
on Friday when they raided the man's home in connection with the recent bombings in Port of Spain. Darryl 
Heeralal “Police to meet hit list targets,” Trinidad Express, November 21, 2005. Available from 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_news?id=117735371, Last accessed November 20, 2005. 
47 He is a personal friend of Colonel Mummar Quadaffi, Louis Farrakhan in the United States and 
several other groups in Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Sudan where he is seen as a revolutionary and man of 
action. Camini Marajh. “Time to Mount Tighter Muslimeen Watch,” Trinidad and Tobago Express, August 
22, 2004.  
48 Training, funds, arms, and support for the 1990 coup attempt originated in Libya. Libya’s role in 
sponsoring terrorism against the United States is well known. U.S. State Department Patterns of Global 
terrorism report 2002. Available from http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/19988.htm, Last 
accessed November 18, 2005. 
49 In a recent speech entitled “Discussions on matters of social and political significance,” at the 
Croisee, San Juan Trinidad on Friday, August 15, 2005, Abu Bakr stated “People walking in Trinidad 
hungry, nothing to eat, children sleeping on the streets, old people, young people suffering and Trinidad is 
the largest producer of methanol (and) ammonia in the world; we supply 76 percent of gas for the great 
monolith of America (but) there’s no jobs; they framed a case against me, and in so doing they tested the 
waters.” Sasha Mohammed, “Jamaat Blasts Media,” Trinidad Guardian On line. July 17, 2005. Available 
from http://www.guardian.co.tt/news7.html, Last accessed September 28, 2005. 
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Islamic world, and the religious connotations of the Government’s crackdown, and 
targeting of the radical groups leader50 (state versus radical Islam) I argue that what is 
required is U.S. security assistance in preventing any retaliation or backlash from this 
group. The United States intelligence system could be vital in this regard in preventing 
foreign intervention of any kind.  
C. THE LOCAL SECURITY FORCES AVAILABLE TO SECURE THE 
ENERGY SECTOR 
The Government has committed the finite resources of the Defence Force to 
tackle what it sees as its first two priorities: crime and terrorism. The upsurge in crime 
has proven to be beyond the capabilities of the national police51 which itself is reforming 
and, like Jamaica, this has lead to TTDF soldiers being deployed out on the streets in high 
crime areas in support of the police. Without a clear national security strategy, this 
appears as another political quick fix. Lack of direction and metrics to measure the 
effectiveness of these strategies, or to provide other solutions, produces mission creep, 
and personnel fatigue, which further leads to retention problems. This ultimately leads to 
poorer service, less quality operations by the nation’s military services, are already 
stretched to the limit with their current tasks and resources, and less actual “security” 
operations. The government needs to commit its strategy to paper and provide the funds 
to support it. One of the first priorities of such a document must be securing the nation’s 
economic engine, the energy industry, because this sector provides the funds for all other 
projects.  
While the Government has invested heavily in the energy sector it has not 
concomitantly invested in the security of the sector. The Trinidad and Tobago Coast 
Guard has just one 60m, 15-knot Offshore Patrol vessel in its inventory: the TTS Nelson, 
 
50 Where Al Qaeda affiliated groups can view the situation as another case where a Western allied 
state is cracking down on Muslims. 
51“In addition, much of the Police Service has lost the respect of society, primarily because a) the 
perception of rogue cops in the system has not been adequately dealt with, and b) because of a lack of 
transparent investigations or closure of numerous reports of police misconduct and brutality in the conduct 
of their duties. Their credibility needs to be reestablished, not through a public relations job, but by 
sustained actions.” A proposal forwarded by Am Cham to bring in Rudolph Giuliani and Bernard Kerik 
(former Commissioner of the New York Police Department) to submit a strategic plan to fight escalating 
crime in the island was rejected by the Minister of National Security. The American Chamber of 
Commerce of Trinidad and Tobago. Statement on Current Crime Situation, April 20, 2005. 
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which is 28 years old. The Coast Guard maintained two highly sophisticated C-26 
surveillance aircraft, which patrolled regularly but these aircraft have been handed over 
to the recently formed Trinidad and Tobago Air Guard and the unit no longer exercises 
operational control of these aircraft.52 Oil and gas operations are concentrated offshore on 
the southwestern coast and southeastern coasts. TTCG maritime response times from its 
bases at Tobago and Staubles Bay, Trinidad, (West Coast), are five hours and ten hours 
respectively to the East Coast. A base is maintained at Point Galeota on the southeastern 
tip of Trinidad but no vessel, other than a small craft, is kept there on a permanent basis 
(the current facilities do not allow for a vessel larger than eighty feet even if one were 
available). The extremely rough waters on the East coast make small boat operations 
difficult and dangerous but not impossible (in terms of gaining entry to platforms). The 
TTCG unit also maintains a Base at Fullarton on the southwest coast but this base can 
also only accommodate very small craft and its chief mission is protection of fishermen 
in the area and counter-drug operations. I argue that the TTCG does not have adequate 
proximate bases to secure these vital operations and it needs to significantly develop the 
facilities it already has in order to maintain a meaningful presence in the oil and gas 
areas.53
The Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard has a first world capable maritime Special 
Forces unit, the Special Naval Unit (SNU). However, its focus since the late 1980s has 
been on counter-drug operations. It presently possesses no real time capability in 
maritime counter-terrorist operations in the oil and gas industry domain.54 The last time 
the SNU was trained to mission capability in this discipline was in 1988/90 by the 
 
52 Source: Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard Daily Operational Status Reports. 2004 & Source T& T 
Coast Guard official website. Available at http://www.ttdf.mil.tt/ttcg/index.html. Last accessed November 
19, 2005. 
53 This argument is based on 13 years of actual operational experience in these areas, responding to 
emergency situations in the oil fields, as a patrol boat commander and commander of the TTDF/CG SNU. 
54 Colin Gray, Explorations in Strategy. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996, p. 164, describes special 
operations as expressions of agility, maneuver, and finesse. Special operations forces are of greatest 
strategic utility in peacetime or in low intensity conflicts, which are the contexts wherein they uniquely 
provide military or paramilitary options to policymakers with acute security problems (p. 185). For 
protection and deterrence to be successful, maritime security forces must be visible, vigilant, well trained, 
well equipped, mobile, adaptive, and capable of generating effective presence quickly, randomly, and 
unpredictably. The National Maritime Strategy of the United States Washington: The White House, March 
8, 2005, Sec.iv, p. 22. 
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prestigious U.S. Navy Seal Team 6 Red Cell55 but nearly all of the members who 
received this training have since left the unit. The unit no longer possesses any of the 
necessary low velocity ammunition, flash suppressors or specialized climbing equipment 
for operations in this arena, nor has there been the requisite familiarization with the new 
types of platforms. The ability to assemble a unit for these types of operations is a long 
term and expensive process that requires specialized equipment, constant training, and 
access to actual facilities for practice.56 The government should start equipping this unit 
as quickly as possible to address this lack of capability.  
In 2003, the TTDF began the National Energy Assets Protection group, which 
visited the offshore platforms of all major energy producing firms and ports in Trinidad 
and Tobago.57 A dossier was prepared for each facility with audit results and 
recommendations for improved security and target hardness at these facilities, but the 
group had no authority to enforce their implementation. It is uncertain if any of the 
recommendations were implemented because this joint Army/Coast Guard unit was a 
temporary arrangement. What is needed is a more permanent entity to address ongoing 
development and trends in maritime security related to the local energy industry and to 
ensure the sector is adequately secured.  
The government has also undertaken to implement a new high definition Israeli 
radar system in the TTCG’s coastal radar surveillance system. This system covers a 
substantial portion of the western and eastern oil fields, however, integral to a detection 
system are the physical assets to respond to a detected target and this area needs to be 
dramatically improved. 
 
55Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard Temporary Memorandum file folder for 1988 and 1990. Volume 
1. 
56 The success of special forces responses to incidences of terror apart from minimizing casualties is to 
be what Napoleon, Jomini and Clausewitz all agree on, “to be superior at the decisive spot” Colin Gray, 
Explorations in Strategy. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996, p. 147. Knowledge about that decisive “spot” 
or operating area is essential to ensure success.  
57 Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force weekly orders March –August 2004.  
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In March 2004, the TTCG assembled its Port security branch charged with the 
security of maritime ports.58 Its functions are primarily administrative, and it is the 
registered authority for signing off or approving port security plans at these energy 
facilities. It is still in its growth phase and is presently understaffed and challenged for 
resources and it does not possess any patrol assets or dedicated response units. 
The Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard possesses five patrol vessels (four 27m-
patrol vessels, and one 60-meter offshore patrol vessel) all in excess of 20 years old, and 
some thirty other very small patrol craft. Generally, there is limited presence by the Coast 
Guard in the area due to asset limitations, and this contributes to the ease of access to 
these platforms by terrorists, because there is no deterrent and very limited early 
detection assets to prevent attacks. 
The assets that do exist to patrol these areas are slow (18 knots maximum) and 
there is no quick surface response capability by law enforcement. There is a five-hour 
minimum response by vessels for East Coast, and one hour for West Coast, with the 
current basing and asset arrangements, headquartered mainly at Staubles Bay. 
By air, it takes an average of thirty-five minutes to access West and East Coast 
fields by light unarmed helicopter and surveillance aircraft from the Trinidad and Tobago 
Air Guard’s main base at Piarco. This may be too long, and the relative limited loiter 
capability for helicopter and aircraft based on limited fuel capacity means credible 
security in the oil fields can only be achieved by a system of continuous presence using 
surface assets. The government needs to invest in a real time, sustainable offshore patrol 
capability to match its expanded energy sector initiatives. Presently this sector accounts 
for 34 % of GDP, yet just a fraction of the minuscule Defense budget (0.6% of GDP) is 
used to secure it.  
It is worthwhile to reiterate and strongly recommend that the government forge 
closer ties with the United States in this mutually important domain and that the U.S. 
 
58 The government has also recently spent 95 million on container scanning equipment, and other ISPS 
security related equipment and infrastructure, and is among the first to fully implement the code regionally. 
This was in concert with the formation of an entire branch (equal in size to an army battalion) of the 
Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard to be solely devoted to Port Security. Source T& T Coast Guard official 
website. Available at http://www.ttdf.mil.tt/ttcg/index.html, Last accessed November 19, 2005. 
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sponsor the relevant training to build capability in this vital sector. Trinidad’s 
government cannot escape the fact that heavy investment and development of the island’s 
maritime security apparatus is the only way to ensure continued economic prosperity and 
the continued supply of these essential services, in light of maritime-based national and 
trans-national threats.59 Therefore the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force/Coast Guard 
must continue its efforts to update its equipment, and human and intellectual capital to 
face the specific security challenges posed in the local energy sector. The Government 
must articulate, in writing and legislation, after a process of national debate, training, 
research and in adherence to international practice, agreements and obligations, a national 
military strategy, defining the direction and vision for military transformation in Trinidad 
and Tobago. In the words of Richard Clarke, former National Coordinator for Security 
and Counter-Terrorism, “history is nothing more than a list of events that never 
previously happened”60 and the next security crisis is not going to wait on the 
government.  
 
59 This will continue to be challenging without U.S. support and spaces at its training institutions. 
60 Tufts E-News. “Assessing A New Security Threat,” June 1, 2005. Available from 
http://www.tufts.edu/communications/stories/060105AssessingANewSecurityThreat.htm, Last accessed 
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IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ATTACK ON THE LOCAL 
ENERGY SECTOR 
In this chapter, I will look at the impact of a terrorist attack on Trinidad’s energy 
sector. I will illustrate the high costs such an attack could incur on the petroleum 
corporation, the government, and the entire Trinidad and Tobago economy. I will then 
show how this sector provides funds for the stability, security, and development of the 
Caribbean region and what the possible effects would be if the revenue that supports 
these initiatives were significantly disrupted. I will then outline the possible effect of an 
attack on the U.S. economy, by looking at natural gas’s role in the U.S. economy and the 
impact of higher natural gas prices, brought about by supply disruption, in the wake of a 
significant attack in Trinidad and Tobago.  
A. THE LOCAL COSTS OF AN ATTACK 
A significant attack on a major platform will have several impacts. The most 
important will be the loss of life. An effective high explosive attack on an administration 
building can result in the deaths of an average of 120 persons, while a platform attack in 
the vicinity of 35-50 workers during the day and average of 8 at night.61 The presence of 
American and British expatriate workers makes this loss of life at both locations 
significant. This would be significant because the nationality of some of the targets 
provides subtle assurance that international news stations will cover the event. 
Other ancillary benefits to the terrorists would be the huge costs that the 
corporations and the government would incur to increase security62 on a large scale 
rapidly, and to fund reconstruction. The cost of an attack and destruction of a local 
offshore platform can be illustrated in the following crude calculations. 
I will use BPTT’s Cassia platform as an example that produces natural gas at a 
rate of 1.6 billion cubic feet /per day. To look at the costs incurred we will assume that 
 
61 TTDF NEAP study unclassified information. 
62 The government will tend to spend more than it normally would in a scenario similar to panic 
buying after the passage of destructive hurricane early in the hurricane season, in anticipation of the next 
storm.  
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wellhead gas is sold at $7 per MCF63 (or 1000cf). We will also assume, based on the 
information in chapter one, Appendix A, that a 90-day period is the time needed to cap the 
well and restart production bearing in mind the time taken to ship in expert advice, and 
specially fabricated materials from overseas, and the difficulty of undertaking repair 
operations in the unstable and volatile marine environment.  
 
Table 7. Breakdown of Expected Loss of a Major Platform 
 
Item Cost Remarks 
Lives Day 35-50 Night 15-25 
On average there are 10-15 
expatriate workers per platform at 
night.  
Physical cost 250 million USD 
If a standby vessel is also 
destroyed, then an additional 2 
million is incurred. 
Loss of production (Central 
processing platform) 1.008 billion USD 
The total revenue loss per day 
equals $11,200,000.00 USD (1.6 
billion/1000 *$7) by 90 days. 
Communications 2 million USD 
Media conferences, brand 
assurance marketing and price 
share stability media campaigns. 
Clean up and disposal 45 million USD 
Salvage, towing, and 
environmental cleanup, taking into 
account the size of BPPTT64. 
Death Benefits 7 million USD 35 people at an average of $200,000 each65. 
                                                 
63 In the wake of the Katrina disaster natural gas prices now hover in the vicinity of 12 USD per Mcf, 
however 7 USD per Mcf is used as a base price for ease of calculation in the face of fluctuations. 
64 The disposal of the Brent Spar platform (1995) in the North Sea cost in excess of 43 Million 
pounds. Information on the Brent Spar available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/221508.stm, 
Last accessed September 28, 2005. 
65 According to a RAND study conducted after the September 11th terrorists attacks 2,551 persons 
were killed and another 215 seriously injured. Survivors of this group received some 8.6 billion dollars, 
more than 69% coming from the Government for an average of $3.1 million per victim (the rest came from 
insurers and charities). Lloyd Dixon and Rachel Kaganoff “Compensating the Victims of 9/11,” The 
RAND Corporation, Washington: 2004. Available from http://www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB9087/, 
Last accessed October 11, 2005. 
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Item Cost Remarks 
Loss to Government: The 
present royalty system is 
12.5% of petroleum 
produced, and a petroleum 
production levy 3% gross 
income. 
153 million dollars Tax 1.4 million dollars + levy 
$336,000.00 rounded 
1.7 million dollars per day x 90 
days 
Litigation ? By family members for inadequate security. 
Insurance ? 
The present deductible is as high 
as 10 million USD. An attack 




? For the spillage of oil, diesel. 
Approx. Total 1.06 billion dollars66
 
N.B. 7 USD per MCF is the market price used in the calculations, it must be remembered that 
although BPTT Gas is sold to Atlantic LNG at a lower discounted price, the difference is recovered as 
BPTT has part ownership in Atlantic LNG and the other plants that it sells to.  
The Cassia well collects gas from five wells; therefore the average production per well is 32000MCF. 
Therefore if a single platform is targeted the production loss would be 2.24 million per day or 201.6 
million dollars for 90 days.  
Total loss using formula =$533 million dollars. 
We can use this figure of 500 million USD as a base line short-term cost of a 
terrorist attack on an offshore platform. Interestingly this amount corresponds to the 
approximate cost of procurement of about three 60m offshore patrol vessels. Perhaps this 
figure could be used an indicator of the type of investment necessary to provide some 
basic maritime patrol capability to secure the oil fields.  
The calculations above (Table 7) do not take into account the loss in investor 
confidence and other adverse effects that are difficult to quantify in the wake of a terrorist 
                                                 
66 “Data for the period 2001-2003 suggests that BPTT contributed an estimated 7.9 billion USD or 
55% of the government’s oil sector revenue. The data demonstrate conclusively that variations in 
Government revenue from year to year may be significantly affected by the developments at BPTT.” The 
Energy Correspondent “The BP Factor,” Trinidad Express On Line, October 27, 2004. Available from 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=43846257, Last accessed September 28, 2005. 
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attack. Also not taken into account are the increased security costs and losses from the 
emergency shutdowns of other wells that would most likely occur immediately after a 
terrorist attack, as a precaution. BPTT has shared ownership in Atlantic LNG, some of 
the Methanol plants at Pt. Lisas, and the Power Generation Company of Trinidad and 
Tobago. BPTT’s losses would be more significant than the costs of the direct attack on 
the platform. In fact, losing the Cassia platform would represent a 60% loss in the supply 
of available natural gas to the other feeder industries. Atlantic LNG and other industries 
to which the gas is supplied would also incur losses, as they would be operating below 
maximum capacity and they could also possibly shutdown, as it is understood that it is 
unprofitable to operate the plant below a specific capacity. The Pt. Lisas Industrial Estate 
depends on natural gas for power, thus this situation could cause a shutdown of 
operations at the Estate, if even temporarily, in the same way. The Government of 
Trinidad and Tobago would experience a shortfall in revenues, most likely resulting in an 
increase in the public sector deficit. 
Safety concerns by workers could also trigger low turnouts or strikes until 
security systems are improved. A strike at the Atlantic LNG plant in April 2004 cost the 
Government an estimated 2 million USD a day.67 Atlantic LNG incurred 190 million 
USD in standby costs, to continue production of the fourth train (additional capacity) or 
fourth processing plant at Pt. Lisas.68 Losses to the local community, Pt. Fortin were put 
at 1 million USD per day.69
Two recent events provide an example of the possible effects of a significant 
attack on the energy infrastructure in Trinidad and Tobago. On Monday September 26th, 
2005 a bubble developed in the main 24-inch natural gas pipeline, which runs from 
Beach Field (South Coast) to Pt. Lisas and The Trinidad and Tobago Electricity 
Commission (via INCOGEN, and POWERGEN the two main power generating 
 
67 South Chamber of Industry and Commerce of Trinidad and Tobago, “Economic Growth Needs 
Industrial Peace,” April 2005. Available from 
www.southchamber.org/initiatives/initiative.aspx?CategoryID=1400&id=2928, Last accessed November 
22, 2005. 
68 The Trinidad Guardian Online, “Package to Cost ALNG $88M,” April 17, 2004. Available from 
http://www.guardian.co.tt/archives/2004-04-17/news3.html, Last accessed September 28, 2005. 
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companies on the island). This resulted in load shedding across the island, millions of 
dollars in losses at the Pt. Lisas industrial park, which was closed down over a two-day 
period, and caused the Police and security forces to go on high alert.70
The Petrobras P 36 rig tragedy also provides a stark example of the consequences 
of an attack on Trinidad’s critical gas producing platforms. On Tuesday March 20th, 
2001, the Brazilian oil company Petrobras’s P 36 rig (the largest in the world) sank into 
the water after a series of explosions. The rig was located offshore, 120 miles northeast of 
Rio de Janeiro. The explosion and sinking killed nine oil workers.  
Petrobras says its fiscal 2001 earnings could be hurt by as much as $450m 
because of the disaster on the platform. The company's shares have lost 
7.6% of their value since the explosions. In addition to the costs of lost 
output, Petrobras now face higher insurance costs. The sunken rig was 
insured for $500m and the accident caused panic in the insurance market. 
The company face fines of more than $70m for the oil and diesel leaking 
from the sunken structure, apart from compensation payments to the 
families of dead crew members and other related costs.71  
Oil union leaders have called for a work slowdown on Thursday to protest 
poor working conditions and to remember the accident. Petrobras shares 
closed down 2.3 percent at 49.90 reais ($23.80) after the company 
announced the rig had sunk. The P-36 rig cost $350 million and is insured 
for $500 million. The firm should receive the insurance payment in the 
next six months.72
“All production was halted at P-36 and Petrobras said it could lose $50 million a 
month with the rig out of operation. Oil imports would then rise, hurting Brazil's fragile 
trade balance.”73
 
69 Trinidad Express Online, “ALNG, Worker Impasse Hurting Business,” March 31, 2004. Available 
from http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/articl?id=22953040, Last accessed August 27, 2005. 
70 Curtis Williams, “Security Forces on High Alert as Energy Crisis Looms.” Trinidad Guardian oOn 
Line, September 27, 2005. Available from http://www.guardian.co.tt/news4.html, Last accessed September 
26, 2005. 
71 BBC News On Line, March 21, 2001. Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1231702.stm. Last accessed September 28, 2005. 
72 Reuters News Service, March 21, 2001. Available from 
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/0320-02.htm, Last accessed September 28, 2005. 
73 Peter Muello, “Brazil Tries to Save Oil Rig,” Associated Press. March 20, 2001. Available from 
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/a-list/2001-March/016183.html, Last accessed September 28, 2005. 
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It must be remembered that Brazil is one of the largest countries in the world, and 
its economy dwarfs Trinidad and Tobago’s, therefore the effects of a similar incident 
would be much larger in Trinidad and Tobago. The local economy has been characterized 
as inflated by a gas boom and real estate bubble, loosely regulated and lacking in data 
collection, in order to accurately assess macroeconomic shocks. Jwarla Rambaran74 
contends that real estate prices in Trinidad and Tobago are linked to the expatriate 
community and the present gas boom. This has caused a related construction boom and 
increased consumption generally by increased foreign exchange earnings spent in the 
local economy. Any major disruption in the energy sector or expatriate flight could cause 
the bubble to burst.  
He indicates systemic weakness in the local financial system, mainly weak data 
gathering capabilities and loosely regulated finance houses and lending and construction 
agencies, can cause crisis in the financial system in such an environment. He contends 
that there was a precedent for this prediction because a very similar situation unfolded in 
the late 1980s during the collapse of Trinidad’s first oil boom when oil prices plummeted. 
Certainly a major attack will cause all of the planned project’s timelines to be extended or 
reconsidered, incurring further costs and penalties. Most of the government planned 
initiatives will be hamstrung, including elaborate plans to relocate the Port of Spain port 
and expand the capital through the construction of a boardwalk and several high-rise 
buildings on the water line it presently occupies.  
Halted production will also act like a consumption tax as expenditures will be 
kept to a minimum, and the country’s foreign reserves will be depleted to stabilize the 
situation. Consumption and expenditure in all related spheres will be reduced until 
production can be restarted and security assured. While a significant terrorist act itself 
cannot snuff out the entire economy in one blow it can make the country, (along with 
rising crime) less attractive to foreign investment in terms of risk and security costs. 
 
74 Jwarla Rambarran, “Financial Crises in T&T: Can They Happen Again ?” Trinidad Express, March 
16, 2005. Available from http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=67223206, Last accessed 
September 28, 2005. 
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What is extremely important in this regard is the perception of the population. Gold75 
contends that while the level of loss from the events of September 11th were in the region 
of 33-36 billion, the New York economy bounced back relatively quickly because the 
public perception was that this was a one time, extraordinary event. In light of the series 
of terrorist bombings in Trinidad and Tobago (and surging crime), a significant terrorist 
attack could be viewed as a higher level of persistent violence emerging within the 
society, and could be a turning point for investor flight.  
It must also be noted that the perception of investors is also important as to how 
they measure the risk against the possible revenue to be earned. It can be argued that the 
Iraqi oil and gas industry is under weekly attack by insurgents in Iraq yet the operations 
continue. A similar case can be made for Nigeria. However the central thesis remains the 
same. A significant attack in Trinidad and Tobago would raise costs of doing business in 
terms of security and insurance, and make it no better in terms of stability. Therefore its 
attractiveness and comparative advantage in terms of lower costs due to stability and 
proximity would be reduced. In an expanding gas market, foreign operators have the 
choice to shift operations to where there are lower costs and larger reserves. 
Despite the nation’s significant foreign reserves, the size of the island and the 
small scale of its energy sector will dictate that such an event will be felt severely across 
the island’s economy, which is so heavily reliant on the energy sector. 
Jwarla Ramabaran puts it succinctly: 
Even the 2004 White paper on Reform of the financial system which touts 
the ambitious objective of making T&T the pan –Caribbean Financial 
Centre, was regrettably silent on a systematic assessment of underlying 
vulnerabilities and analysis of structural reform priorities to make the 
sector less crisis prone….Weak data also works against carrying out stress 
tests to determine the ability of the finance system to cope with 
macroeconomic shocks like a 30 percent depreciation of the TT dollar, a 
sharp fall in crude oil prices to $12 dollars per barrel, or a sudden stop in 
capital inflows….Closer inspection reveals that a few large banks and  
 
75 Gold David, “Economics of Terrorism.” Available from http://www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/god01/, 
Last accessed September 28, 2005. 
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insurance companies have rising cross country exposures to Eastern 
Caribbean economies with weak growth prospects and high debt burdens, 
raising the risk of contagion.76
B. REGIONAL ECONOMIC LINKAGES 
Trinidad and Tobago’s energy driven economy is a critical node in the 
Caribbean’s networked economy77 and any incident that significantly affects the 
economy of Trinidad and Tobago will have a negative ripple effect in the region. Its 
status as an oil/gas rich country, has thrust the twin island state into assuming many 
obligations towards the region’s economic development and stability, which it has 
consistently fulfilled. In the following sections, we will look at how Trinidad and Tobago 
has shouldered its perceived obligation to less developed economies within the greater 
Caribbean economy, in terms of general exports, petroleum products and in providing 
development funds and loans to the wider Caribbean economy. We will then look at the 
effects of a disruption of revenue in Trinidad and Tobago’s energy sector and its potential 
negative effects on the economic stability and security of the region. 
Trinidad is one of the wealthiest members of the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM). The Caribbean Community concept is based on an agreement, which calls 
for an economic and political union of the Caribbean island states, similar to the 
European Union. Exports from Trinidad and Tobago account for 82 percent of intra-
regional exports. These exports include petroleum, resources, light manufactured goods, 
foodstuff, cooking gas, plastics, and construction materials. Many of these items are 
provided at much lower prices than the other alternative U.S. imports. Exports from 
Trinidad represent a critical supply of everyday items for the smaller islands. A 
disruption in this flow could severely effect the day to day life in these islands and cause 
economic hardship for the average citizen. Accessing substitutes will take time and will 
be more costly to the average consumer.  
 
76 Jwarla Rambarran, “Financial Crises in T&T: Can They Happen Again?” Trinidad Express, Last 
accessed September 28, 2005. 
77 There are plans to establish a single Caribbean Market Economy but the move towards 
implementation has been slow and it is doubtful if this objective will be completed on target for 2008. 
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Trinidad and Tobago has been consistent in its support to the islands of the Lesser 
Antilles as they face severe economic adjustment from changes in the globalized banana 
industry. With the impending withdrawal of preferential market status in Europe in 2007 
(their primary market) many of these islands’ main cash crops now face difficult 
competition, and the race is on to prepare for this and diversify there economies to 
sustainability. A similar fate awaits the regional sugar industry, which is the other 
mainstay of the smaller islands. Many of these islands, reliant on the banana and sugar 
industries, have been attempting to capture new niches as Honeymoon destinations in the 
highly competitive tourist market. Tax holidays and other incentives have encouraged the 
construction of all-inclusive type facilities like the International Sandals chain in islands 
like St. Lucia and St. Kitts.78 Support from Trinidad and Tobago is crucial to these 
islands in terms of airlift, soft loans for development and the continuous supply of 
petroleum at stable prices in the face of exogenous shocks and failing economies. In 
Dominica for example, Trinidad and Tobago has bought millions of dollars of its 
government securities in order to keep the island’s economies afloat. 
Trinidad’s government also maintains two funds specifically for regional 
development, a 100 million USD trade support fund and a 300 million USD poverty 
alleviation fund, which can be used at the discretion of the Prime Minister. In fact, British 
West Indian Airways (BWIA), Trinidad’s national airline, which is 97% owned by the 
government of Trinidad and Tobago is the main means of connection to Leeward Islands 
Air Transport (LIAT), the island hopping airline and main source of transport to these 
smaller islands. The smaller Antigua based inter island airline LIAT, has been kept alive 
by the Trinidad’s government through cash handouts, and non-repayable loans. In 
January 2005, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago agreed to fund a 120 million USD 
 
78 “The Prime Minister of St. Kitts, Nevis Denzil Douglas traveled to Trinidad yesterday to meet with 
Manning and press his point that St. Kitts/Nevis should be a weekly stop for BWIA’s Toronto – Port of 
Spain route.…He said this was important because St. Kitts/Nevis was attempting to develop its tourism 
industry which had been limited by lack of air lift….He said: ‘As you know we have had serious 
difficulties with the sugar industry which has been responsible for rising government debt and so we are 
trying to diversify the economy away from its dependence of sugar and the tourism service industry is one 
way to diversify.” Curtis Williams “St. Kitts seeks help from BWIA,” Trinidad Express On Line, June 22, 
2004. Available from http://www.trinidadexpress.com/indexpl/article?id=27218602. Last accessed August 
27, 2005. 
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bailout to the airline from the 300 million USD poverty alleviation fund.79 This has 
followed an earlier financial bailout in 2004 of some 19 million USD. 
Financially Trinidad and Tobago’s locally owned private sector banks are now 
dominant in the region. Prior to this, Barbados was the traditional financial centre of the 
Caribbean. Beginning in 2003, however, Trinidad’s Republic Bank acquired controlling 
interest in the Barbados National Bank, capturing assets of $3.1 billion and responsibility 
for some 4000 employees spread across the Caribbean in its branches and subsidiaries.80 
In 2004 Trinidad’s Royal Bank (RBTT) Financial Holdings acquired Barbados’ 
Caribbean Commercial Bank. This complimented RBTT ownership of nine other 
Caribbean commercial banks spread throughout the Caribbean including the Dutch ABC 
(Aruba, Bonaire and Curaçao) islands. Trinidad and Tobago’s commercial financial 
sector has acted in the capacity of the region’s development banking sector in recent 
years. Local commercial banks and private conglomerates have repeatedly provided 
funds to regional governments at more attractive commercial rates than offered by 
American and international lending institutions. Local conglomerate Guardian holdings 
(a local insurance group, backed by local commercial banks) and Trinidad and Tobago’s 
Unit Trust Corporation have agreed to be the financial backer behind the proposed intra-
Caribbean gas pipeline supplying natural gas to several islands in the region.81
Trinidad and Tobago has also consistently offered all types of economic 
assistance to the region. In May 1996, Trinidad and Tobago agreed to underwrite(or write 
off) 67% or 356 million USD of the 536 million USD claims made against Guyana at the 
Paris Club. In 1999, 58 million USD was written off, and a further 71 million USD in  
 
79 Editorial Trinidad Express Online, January 13, 2005. Available from 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=54863080, Last accessed September 28, 2005. 
80 Richard Costas, “Banking on Change,” Caribbean Beat Magazine, March 2005, 72. 
81 “Guardian Holdings and the New AIC Group Have Agreed to Finance the Feasibility Study and the 
Project in the Event Commercial Viability is Proven.” The Energy Correspondent “Caribbean Gas Pipeline- 
a Step Closer,” Trinidad Express Online, February 25, 2004 .Available from 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=13750270, Last accessed September 28, 2005. 
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debt relief is being sought in the near future, based on Guyana’s recent qualification for 
debt relief under the conditions of the IMF and World Bank’s International Development 
associations.82
The supply of petroleum products to the region is perhaps the most important 
contribution by Trinidad and Tobago. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago sells 
approximately 50-60,000 barrels of oil a day in the region at subsidized prices. Trinidad 
and Tobago maintains a regional stabilization fund so that the prices offered to the 
smaller islands remain the same in the face of global market fluctuations. The total value 
of the fund is approximately 25 million USD83 and, presently, it assures the sale of oil to 
the smaller islands at a cost of 32 USD per barrel. Trinidad as highlighted intends to build 
a trans-Caribbean pipeline linking Trinidad’s gas processing plants to Barbados, St. 
Lucia, Dominica, Martinique, and Guadeloupe to provide gas for power generation.  
Trinidad has also agreed to supply Jamaica with natural gas through traditional 
means (tanker) and at a very competitive price. In early November 2004, the GORTT and 
the Government of Jamaica signed an MOU calling for a supply of 1.1 million tons of 
LNG to be shipped to Jamaica annually for twenty years.84  
Should a significant attack take place in Trinidad’s energy sector, halting 
production or reducing it significantly, a reduction in the flow of natural resources, 
essential commodities and security services offered to the region could also result. The 
islands will be forced to seek alternative services in the United States, but this could 
prove more difficult in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. 
 
82 Jwarla Rambaran, “Guyana Deserves Debt Waiver from T&T,” Trinidad Express. Available from 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=70789020, Last accessed September 28, 2005. 
83Address delivered at the opening ceremony of the 26th meeting of the conference of Heads of 
Government of the Caribbean Community, The Honourable Patrick Manning Prime Minister of Trinidad 
and Tobago, 3 July, 2005 - Sandals Grande, St. Lucia. Available from 
http://www.guardian.co.tt/archives/2005-07-11/news11.html, Last accessed September 28, 2005. 
84 “Jamaica and Trinidad Sign 20-Year LNG Agreement,” Alexander Gas & Oil Journal, December 9, 
2004, Vol. 9, Issue 24. Available from http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntl44979.htm, Last accessed 
November 21, 2005. 
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Bryan85 contends that a significant part of the wider Caribbean’s air transport, 
tourism, agricultural, mining, and capital markets are dependent on access to the U.S. 
economy. Any terrorist activity within an island that disrupts or increases the hurdles in 
accessibility to U.S. markets and imports could have debilitating effects on the region. 
These security checks and burdens have now become a fact of life and the effects are 
plainly evident in the airline industry, where several major airlines globally are 
experiencing economic difficulties, due to increased fuel costs,86 security regimens, and 
reduced passenger traffic. A major attack will amplify these problems significantly, as 
security and checks are increased as a precaution, particularly if an American oil 
company and or Americans (expatriates) are targeted in the Trinidad and by extension the 
Caribbean. In this regard, Bryan points out that tourism, which is seriously affected by 
terrorism, is the largest earner in 16 out of 28 Caribbean countries87 and the downturn in 
the aviation industry experienced after September 11th is still hurting their economies and 
commodity markets. Another attack could spell doom for this industry. This would be a 
double jeopardy situation because tourism88 is also one of the key areas selected by the 
government of Trinidad and Tobago for diversification of its economy and this will 
definitely also be affected. 
 
85Anthony Bryan and Stephen Flynn. “Free Trade, Smart Borders, and Homeland Security: U.S.-
Caribbean Cooperation in a New Era of Vulnerability.” Miami: The Dante B. Fascell North – South Centre, 
2002.  
86 American Airlines announced Friday it was temporarily cutting flights in markets it serves from its 
two largest hubs, citing high jet fuel prices that were also blamed for a new round of fare increases. Jet fuel 
costs have risen 39 percent in the past month. That alone prompted the decision, said Dan Garton, 
American executive vice president. American said jet fuel cost 91 per cent more Thursday than in 
September 2004, while crude oil prices had increased just half of that amount, 45 per cent, in the same 
period.” Associated Press. September 30, 2005. Available from 
http://abcnews.go.com/business/wirestory?id=1174769, Last accessed October 3, 2005.  
87 World Travel and Tourism council (WTTC). and Trinidad & Tobago Tourism Development 
Corporation. In Trinidad and Tobago it accounts for 33,171 jobs or .8 percent of total employment. 
Tourism has increased 10.2 percent between 2003-2004, 65,475 U.S. residents visited Trinidad and Tobago 
from January to May this year; 8,854 or 16 percent more visitors as compared to the corresponding period 
last year. Visitors from Europe increased by 6,527 or 18.5 percent, from 35,258 in 2003 to 41,785 in 2004 
Available from http://www.wttc.org/measure/PDF/CaribbeanFULLTSA.pdf, Last accessed October 8, 
2005. 
88 Major cruise lines Star Cruises and Radisson Seven Seas and two British airlines, British Airways 
and Virgin Atlantic have already been adding a fuel cost surcharge to passenger tickets, ranging between 
$5-60 dollars in the wake of rising costs associated with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Reuters. April 18, 
2005. Available from http://www.mycaribbeannews.com/tourism/050418d.html, Last accessed October 5, 
2005. 
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Although the country has a healthy balance kept in its foreign (3 Billion) reserves 
and a recently initiated Petroleum revenue stabilization fund, no modeling has yet been 
done on the effects of such an attack. One can only surmise these funds will be tapped 
during the immediate aftermath to keep the economy afloat and on track, however, much 
of this will also be required for recovery and security, including the hardening of the 
remaining infrastructure. Little focus will be cast on helping others in the region, who 
will also be affected by this event.  
In summary while the actual incident may not be a crucial or decisive blow, the 
long term after effects could be very serious for Trinidad’s economy and debilitating for 
the rest of the region. One thing is certain the government needs to initiate research and 
modeling on the effects of such an attack, in order to adequately prepare for such an 
eventuality. Hurricane Katrina’s destructive wrath inflicted on Louisiana and Mississippi 
has also recently emphasized the point of training, preparations, and modeling for all 
possible scenarios. 
C. REGIONAL SECURITY NETWORKS 
A major attack on Trinidad and Tobago’s energy sector apart from the economic 
effects described above could also seriously curtail Trinidad and Tobago’s significant 
contributions to the stability and security of the wider Caribbean region. Trinidad and 
Tobago’s strategic location as the first island off the Latin American coast makes it 
extremely important in curtailing the flow of arms and narcotics to the other smaller 
islands whose capability for defense is constrained by limited resources. Trinidad and 
Tobago’s oil wealth has allowed it to purchase, operate, and maintain some of the most 
sophisticated security equipment in the region to address these local and regional threats. 
It is Trinidad’s strategic location and the sophisticated security systems it maintains 
which make Trinidad and Tobago’s contribution to the region important and significant. 
Any significant reduction in the revenue stream from the energy sector reduces 
Trinidad’s ability to mount the best possible defense. This translates to procuring and 
employing the most modern equipment and techniques against these security threats 
within the territorial boundaries of the island and the wider Caribbean. 
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Trinidad and Tobago maintains three main Intelligence agencies89 coordinated by 
the National Security Council with very sophisticated surveillance equipment. The 
Ministry of National Security is presently integrating the information from these three 
agencies to provide a regionally interfaced (linked to other intelligence clearing houses in 
the region), real time intelligence capability90 for anti-narcotic and anti-terror operations. 
Coordination of this system is achieved at a national/regional incident command and 
management center91. Links have also been established with the Eastern Caribbean 
Regional Security System to facilitate regional operations. It is easy to see that constant 
upgrades are required to keep pace with changing technology and new systems adopted 
by all participants in this system. However, no other island maintains such a coordinated, 
integrated, and constantly upgraded intelligence and response network, and many 
regional operations are headquartered in Trinidad and Tobago.92 Trinidad and Tobago 
coordinates CD/CT daily missions in the region as it has the region’s most developed 
capacity to track and interdict targets as they move through the islands. This capability 
has greatly diminished, though, because of the lack of assets possessed by the TTCG. 
Interdiction is usually carried out when the target of interest enters the waters under the 
 
89 The three agencies are the Strategic intelligence Agency, Strategic Services Agency and the office 
of the Prime Ministers secretariat to the National Security Council. The TTDF also has a Military 
Intelligence Unit. 
90 The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s office in Port of Spain and newly created Special Anti 
Crime Unit of Trinidad and Tobago SAUTT (a unit similar to the United States’ Federal Bureau of 
Investigation) are linked to this system. Other U.S. field offices, such as the United State’s El Paso 
Intelligence Centre (EPIC), and Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South facilities can also interface 
with this system. Scotland Yard, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the French Military Intelligence 
and Customs, and UK Customs field offices can also be communicated with through the network. 
Information can be passed through the network (once permission is gained from the local embassies) to any 
local patrolling warships from Trinidad and Tobago, France, the United Kingdom, or the Netherlands in the 
Caribbean to prosecute counter-narcotic and counter-terror CD/CT missions. 
91 “We established an Incident Co-ordination center to facilitate information sharing and a more 
effective response by law enforcement officers. Several persons from a number of specialized agencies 
have been selected to staff the center.” 2005 National Budget presentation by the Honourable Patrick 
Manning Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, House of representatives, The Red House, Port of Spain, 
8 October 2004. 
92 Operation Conquistador was simultaneously launched on March 10, 2000, in Panama, Colombia, 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Kitts, Nevis, 
Antigua, Anguila, St. Martin, British Virgin Islands, Barbuda, Grenada, Barbados, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, 
Aruba, Curacao, Jamaica, Haiti, Dominican Republic, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Command 
and control of the operation was executed from the DEA Caribbean Field Division in San Juan, PR, with 
forward command posts in Trinidad & Tobago. Source United States Drug Enforcement Administration 
official website Available from http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/major/conquistador.htm, Last accessed October 
15, 2005. 
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jurisdiction of Trinidad and Tobago. In this vein, Trinidad and Tobago plays a significant 
role in regional law enforcement and information sharing with the smaller islands 
security agencies. 
The Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard, by agreement, has responsibility for all 
search and rescues taking place in the Southern Caribbean up to St. Lucia and out to 
Barbados, (and area of some 76,000 square miles). For this mission it maintains a rescue 
coordinating center at its headquarters at Staubles Bay. TTCG aircraft and surface units 
routinely execute regional search and rescue missions and also carry out CD/CT 
surveillance in this area when on patrol. This arrangement dates back to the 1960s when 
the TTCG was the only regional unit, which had the facilities and assets to lend 
assistance to the region. This agreement continues, and the unit has to devote equipment 
and time to this continuous mission.  
Exercise Tradewinds is an annual exercise involving the region’s militaries. Each 
year at the planning conferences an island is chosen as the host country for that year’s 
serial. The exercise generally involves basic training for the smaller islands newly 
recruited cadres and involves fire fighting, damage control, counter-drug, counter-terror 
and disaster relief, and mass casualty operations (like cruise ship fire, natural disaster or 
terrorist attack). It encourages the region’s forces to work under a joint headquarters and 
to work together to resolve security issues that are likely to occur in the region. The 
exercise is partly sponsored by U.S. Southern Command and there are usually British and 
Dutch contingents, which also participate.  
The Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force along with the Jamaican Defense Force 
and the Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic are among the larger and more capable 
units and they usually contribute the most forces to these exercises. Trinidad and Tobago 
usually provides the bulk of the instructors and operations staff at the headquarters as 
well as a large cadre of infantry, air, and surface assets. Trinidad and Tobago is usually 
asked to transport and host other nations’ military personnel on their assets so as to allow 
other participants to benefit from participation in the higher learning modules despite not 
having the resources themselves. This exercise is an example of the close coordination in 
the region but also illustrates the unequal military capacity of its participants. In the 
 54
                                                
context of CARICOM, Trinidad and Tobago is expected to respond to threats in the 
region quickly and decisively, being one of the few militaries in the region with such a 
capability. 
Trinidad and Tobago training teams have trained the Barbados, Antigua Defense 
Forces with mobile training teams in these small islands. Trinidad has provided officers 
on loan along with Jamaica to the Antigua Barbuda Defense Force on secondment to 
build capacity and systems in these newly formed units. Cadets from Antigua, Barbados 
and St. Kitts are also enrolled at the TTDF officers’ training school at Crows Nest 
Chaguaramas. In summary, Trinidad and Tobago’s economy has allowed it to be a 
benevolent military neighbor to the smaller islands in the region. Trinidad and Tobago 
has constantly provided all type of assistance to the region in this capacity. However it 
must be noted that the TTDF operates consistently with a substantial deficit in manpower, 
and at crisis times, all of these ancillary exercises, training secondments and assistance to 
the region is terminated. Any security situation at home that requires a large-scale 
operation or presence means that little assistance can be offered to the region. 
D. STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS 
Trinidad and Tobago has been a key facilitator of stability and reconstruction 
efforts in the region. Haiti has been a perennial problem and a certain level of 
responsibility comes with assuming leadership in the region. This was demonstrated in 
1995 when Trinidad provided the majority of forces and led the CARICOM contingent 
(on rotation) in the UN supported intervention force in Haiti. TTDF personnel stayed in 
the country for a two-year period and acquired valuable experience in these types of 
operations. Diplomacy plays a large role in these operations. A good example is the 
recent request by the United States during a Manning/Rice meeting93 in December 2003, 
when the U.S. asked that Trinidad and Tobago take over from the United States in 
 
93 “Manning Held Talks with Bush and Other U.S. Officials during a Five Day Visit to the United 
States that Ended Friday.” Michael Smith, “Premier Tells U.S. President His Country is Moving to Protect 
Energy Supplies from Terrorism,” Associated Press, December 20, 2005. Available from http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/universe/document?_m=d8cle434da285el2d82b07d684bcb390, Last accessed December 2, 
2004. 
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security operations in Haiti under the auspices of the United Nations and CARICOM. 
This request was accepted and deployment preparations initiated but never fulfilled.94
Trinidad and Tobago fortunately lies under the Hurricane belt and has 
consistently been spared the catastrophic destruction associated with recent crop of 
storms like Ivan (2004), Katrina, and Rita (2005). As the economic big brother in the 
region, and consistently among the few islands unscathed after the passage of these 
systems, Trinidad and Tobago has become a regional leader in stability and 
reconstruction operations to other affected islands. 
In 2004, the TTDF led a three-month light battalion-sized, stability and 
reconstruction operation in Grenada. The TTDF Task Force Group Grenada comprised 
238 soldiers, several vehicles, four aircraft, three helicopters (in several sorties from 
Trinidad) three heavy lift vessels and other associated patrol vessels from the Coast 
Guard. The TTDF worked with Grenada’s National Emergency Relief Organization and 
the Joint Services Grenada Group, a smaller joint group of Caribbean troops from various 
islands under the coordination and direction of Colonel Milliard TTDF.95 This operation 
was transported and logistically supported by the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard using 
leased offshore platform logistics vessels (from the oil industry) and other leased light 
container vessels.96 These efforts complimented the 10 million USD in direct aid given to 
Grenada by Trinidad and Tobago.  
In providing assistance to Grenada, the Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force 
personnel involved reprised a similar role that was performed in Jamaica on a more 
limited scale during Hurricanes Gilbert and Hugo (1988 and 1999). Ivan struck Grenada  
 
94 This was due to Trinidad’s and CARICOM’s subsequent disapproval of the alleged forceful ousting 
of President Aristide by U.S. diplomatic and military forces, and a refusal to become involved in Haitian 
affairs until the matter was investigated. 
95 Assistance was also received from Venezuela and the French Navy. 
96 The disaster provoked a comprehensive response and contingents from the Trinidad and Tobago 
Police Service and the Government owned Trinidad and Tobago Electricity Commission and community, 
conservation and environmental groups. These groups were transported, and logistically supported by the 
TTDF as they worked alongside TTDF personnel in restoring essential services to Grenada. Local NGO’s 
and citizen groups garnered massive amounts of aid, which was transported by the TTCG. 
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on September 7, 2004 and the pictures of the destruction came from the first TTDF units 
who over flew the island hours later to conduct an assessment in preparation for 
deployment.  
E. FUTURE REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVES 
The area that will be most affected by a reduction in Trinidad’s oil revenue is the 
government’s future plans for the TTDF as a regional force. The present government has 
become keen to develop the Defense Force as a key part in its wider foreign policy as 
economic leader of the Caribbean, now that funds are available. This involves major 
transformation within the TTDF in order for it to be able to project surveillance capability 
and power within the maritime region of the Caribbean to secure the planned intra-
Caribbean pipeline.97 However, the government of Trinidad and Tobago has never 
committed its national security strategy or regional security objectives strategy to paper. 
The Defense Force, in its quest for modernization, efficiency, and transformation to a 
force with national relevance and regional purpose, has used an inductive process, (which 
it has been called on to do from time to time) in collaboration with an analysis of the 
foreign policy and economic goals that the Trinidad and Tobago government has 
outlined, to shape a structure and capability matrix for itself. This has been tied to 
organizational goals, growth, and equipment acquisition in keeping with modern 
practices of military transformation and presented in a document called Vision 2020. This 
has been submitted to the Government for review and is awaiting approval in keeping 
with its larger National 2020 vision plan.  
This Vision 2020 document calls for the Defense Force to develop naval task 
groups with vessels capable of regional troop lift, disaster relief, and command and 
control facilities to operate with patrol escorts and auxiliaries in joint regional operations. 
The Trinidad and Tobago Army (the land forces component of the Defense Force) is also 
developing a combined arms, battalion-sized, expeditionary force in order to support this 
concept and it is expected that it will work in a joint command concept with the task 
groups. The Coast Guard is presently recruiting new officers (the 2020 document calls for 
 
97 The 2020 plan calls for a phased increase from just under 4000 personnel to 16,000 personnel over 
10 years just to undertake the current missions effectively and to be able to provide a battalion-sized 
presence in the region on call. 
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a force of 3000 by 2020, the present strength is 1040) and sourcing further training. The 
unit has recently committed and funded a series of officers in rotation, to attend 
expensive courses at Royal Navy institutions during the 2005-2006 period, to facilitate 
the operation of these larger assets when they arrive in early 2007.98 Along with these 
new assets on order, the unit has recently begun training some of its officers at U.S and 
Canadian military institutions in peace-keeping and stability and reconstruction 
operations, to empower its officer corps with the skills to support and command these 
types of missions, in a joint force-oriented TTDF. It has also taken up regional counter-
terrorism fellowships and courses in order to keep its officers abreast of regional 
developments and U.S. responses to terror and drug trafficking in the region.  
The Government of Trinidad and Tobago has recently committed to buy three 80 
meter offshore patrol/regional patrol corvettes. The specifications for the regional patrol 
vessels call for sophisticated command and link systems and will also carry ocean 
capable high-speed interceptors, helicopters and Special Forces detachments, to 
participate in joint multi-national missions including disaster relief. Data, imagery, and 
video systems, which can interface with the other First World vessels and U.S. command 
centers operating in the region (U.S. Coast Guard, and JIATF South), will also be 
included at considerable expense. 
The Government has also recently announced its intention to purchased maritime 
coastal radar systems for the islands of the Eastern Caribbean, which can be linked to 
TTCG and other patrolling assets. Procuring, installing and commissioning these sites 
and maintaining a patrol schedule to serve them is a labor intensive and costly initiative. 
Such an initiative requires more manpower, training, and is predicated on uninterrupted 
revenue streams, being generated by the energy sector. 
 
98 While the present crime situation and growing incidence of improvised explosive devices bolster 
and possibly hasten the motivation to acquire these new assets, a significant terrorist attack may wipe out 
the funds necessary for their purchase, operation and maintenance. If they are still acquired after such an 
attack, the ability to assist the region and their regional role may quickly disappear, as a traumatized 
Government and population will most definitely confine them to surveillance and patrol solely around the 
island. The sooner they can be acquired, the better, and the same goes for planned purchase of six fast 
patrol boats for local patrol. These assets are essential and are urgently required to present a credible barrier 
to the arms smugglers who contribute to the crime and terrorism within the island.  
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In order to project surveillance capability throughout the region the GORTT has 
had to surmount the international law and jurisdictional problems by using bilateral and 
regional agreements. The Government of Grenada signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Government of Trinidad ad Tobago and Grenada to allow 
Trinidad and Tobago patrol assets to conduct maritime security patrols around Grenada 
and armed security patrols within its territory after the destruction wrought by Hurricane 
Ivan in September 2004. This type of “facility” may also be placed in the gas supply 
treaty and will be the vehicle for the TTDF to undertake regional security in other 
jurisdictions and territories within the Caribbean. 
There has also been a lot of cooperation within the region to develop protocols 
and mechanisms that would allow a comprehensive regional response to the security 
issues affecting the region. Regular meetings of the CARICOM committee on regional 
crime and security focus on the implementation of frameworks previously agreed upon. 
They include a Legal Framework for Mutual Assistance, Regional Justice Protection, 
Maritime Cooperation, Border Security and Development of the Regional Intelligence 
and Information Sharing Mechanism, and a Coordinating Information Management 
Authority (CIMA) to handle the information developed within the system.99
In conclusion, Trinidad and Tobago’s strategic, geographic location has produced 
many blessings: sanctuary from natural disasters, access to a geological hub of various 
petroleum resources and easy access to Latin American and North American markets. 
The islands’ leaders must however not only safeguard these blessings from the man made 
disasters of terrorism and drug trafficking, but also assist those in the region who are less 
fortunate. Trinidad and Tobago is the dominant trade partner in the region and the 
financial center of the Caribbean and Trinidad’s benevolence to the region has 
significantly contributed to development in the region. If Trinidad and Tobago’s 
prosperity were to deteriorate it will surely be reflected in the reduced amount of  
 
99 Special Meeting of CARICOM Ministers Responsible For National Security and Law Enforcement, 
Port of Spain, May 10, 2005.
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assistance it can offer to the region and possibly the termination of some of the essential 
services presently offered in terms of airlift support and petroleum products and basic 
commodities.  
The worst case scenario would be an attack on Trinidad’s energy sector during the 
passage of a destructive hurricane in the region, and precisely when the region needs the 
most help. Such an attack could also place severe cost, convenience, and security 
premiums on Trinidad’s ability to assist its neighbors in terms of funds and with a 
heightened local threat scenario, little motivation and ability to commit troops to the 
region. Hurricane Katrina and Rita’s paths show that the United States may not be in a 
position to help either.  
F. THE IMPACT OF AN ATTACK ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 
Natural Gas is used in the manufacture of a variety of products that range from 
aspirin, and steel, to plastics, and processed food. It is also used in large quantities by 
commercial establishments for heating and air-conditioning (60% of the heating systems 
in the United States use natural gas).100
Natural Gas is also used to generate 25% of the electricity used in the United 
States. It is estimated that just under 2000 new power plants are needed to meet future 
energy demand over the next ten years and this will significantly affect demand for 
natural gas. The two other major industries in which natural gas is essential are the 
chemical manufacturing and fertilizer industries.101  
Figure 2 provides more detail on natural gas’s role in the U.S. economy and it 
also shows the powerful inflationary effect that a supply disruption could trigger. 
 
100 Variable fluctuations because of climatic dynamics, i.e., longer, colder winters and hotter, longer 
summers also complicate the demand system. 
101 “Consumers will pay $70 billion more for natural gas in 2003 than in 2002. Americans are 
beginning to take notice. A national poll conducted on behalf of the American Chemistry Council found 
that 87% of the public are concerned that higher gas prices will affect them and their families. Last year, 
the U.S. chemical industry’s natural gas bill increased by $6.5 billion.” Natural Gas Crisis “The Energy 













Basic Organic chemicals 35% 
Petrochemicals  18% 
Nitrogenous fertilizers 13% 
Plastic materials, resins 11% 
Basic inorganics  5% 
Industrial gases  4% 
Chlor-alkali  4% 
Others   10% 
Industrial heat & Power 6% 
Other industrial use 25% 
Natural 
Gas 
Metals  13% 
Petroleum, Coal 11% 
Paper  6% 
Chemicals  49% 
Food  6% 
Non-metallic mineral 5% 
Other  10% 
Commercial  14% 
Electric Power sector 25% 
Residential  22% 
Lease, plant fuel  5% 
Transport   3% 
Figure 2.   Natural Gas’s Role in the U.S. Economy (From: Sergey Vasnetov, and 
Zoya Kovenya, “Higher Natural Gas Prices will Decrease Profitability of U.S. 
Petchem Industry,” Oil & Gas Journal, April 28, 2003, p. 52) 
 
G. THE PRESENT U.S. GAS MARKET 
While oil prices have increased by 60% over last year’s prices, natural gas prices 
have risen by 84%. This rise in gas prices has been attributed to increased demand, which 
has increased faster than supply. There are several factors that account for this increasing 
demand. Growth of the air condition industry and switches from traditional fuels (like 
coal and oil) within it to natural gas, as a fuel source for power generation102 is one area 
of demand growth. Pressure by environmental groups and encouragement by the Federal 
Government to use natural gas, in an effort to switch to cleaner burning fuels and to 
reduce oil dependence are other factors. In this vein the majority of new plants today are 
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102 Keith Rattie, President & CEO, Questar Corporation. Testimony before Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources, United States Congress. House of Representatives, February 25, 2003.  
Natural Gas powered.103 “The EIA in its recent Annual Energy Outlook 2003, predicts 
that U.S. natural gas consumption will increase at an average rate of 1.8 percent per year 
to about 35 trillion cubic feet per year in 2025, from 22.7 in 2001. It is expected in the 
period 2005-2020 that imports of LNG will increase to about 11% of the total demand for 
natural gas in the United States from its current weight of 3%. This represents a very 
large increase in actual volumes as represented in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3.   U.S. Net Imports of Natural Gas 1970-2025 (trillion cubic feet) (From: 
The U.S. Department of Energy)104 
 
One of the main factors affecting supply is declining production from domestic 
wells, mainly in the Gulf of Mexico, the majority of which are reaching maturity. There 
is also a lack of LNG import receiving infrastructure in the United States relative to the 
demand. If the estimated demand growth is accurate, this needs to be addressed quickly 
in order to reduce upward pressures on prices in the event of a shortage. Only three new 
terminals have been authorized on the U.S. coastline by October 2005, although there 
were roughly thirty applications pending. The main obstacles are litigation and 
injunctions forced by community environmental groups who fear a terrorist attack, 
accident, or environmental spill impacting the communities adjacent to proposed sites for 
new facilities. 
                                                 
103 Wanda Avila “Electric Perspectives: The Tide Rises for LNG,” March/April 2002. Available from 
http://www.eei.org/magazine/editorial_content/nonav_stories/2002-03-01-tide.htm, Last accessed 11 
October 11, 2005. 
104 .Energy Information. Administration’s Official Website. Available from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/gas.htm, Last accessed October 14, 2005. 
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According to Lee there are approximately 60 LNG plants/facilities being built 
across the globe. He says, however, most of the facilities being built in Iran, Norway, 
Russia, Yemen, Egypt Venezuela, Peru, and Equatorial Guinea, and expansion of already 
existing trains in Qatar, will not be on line until 2010.105 This makes gas from Trinidad 
and Tobago all the more important in the near term because most of its infrastructure is 
already in place. However even when these sites are commissioned, gas from Trinidad 
will still be cheaper by virtue of its close proximity to the United States. Most of the 
discoveries of natural gas in the United States are in environmentally sensitive areas, 
which prohibit development wells. This makes domestic supplies of gas difficult to 
generate in the short term, principally because of the powerful environmental lobby in 
Washington. “At present, 80 percent of the offshore areas are off limits to oil and gas 
development. In addition, these areas under moratoria are estimated to hold at least 79 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas.”106 These factors do make development and production 
from these fields possible in the short to medium term and restricted and expensive in the 
long term.107
Weather systems (tropical storms and hurricanes) disrupt production in the Gulf 
of Mexico, creating shortfalls and delaying delivery from source countries. The 
contracted shipments that resume after the passage of these systems become insufficient 
in the face of rising demand caused by halted production. Also, storm damage often 
precludes their offloading.108
Hurricane Ivan’s damage took six months to be fully repaired and this can be used 
as a rough benchmark for the length of time it takes before production is returned to 
 
106 In addition to extant plants in Brunei, Indonesia, Oman Australia, Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, United 
Arab Emirates and Malaysia. Henry Lee, “Dawning of a New Era: The LNG Story,” Environment and 
Natural Resources Program (ENRP) Discussion Paper 2005-07, John F. Kennedy School of Government. 
Cambridge, MA: April 2005. 
106 Statement of Nolty Theriot, Director, Congressional affairs, National Ocean industries Association, 
U.S. Senate, Committee on energy and natural resources, Natural Gas Symposium. Washington, D.C.: 
January 24, 2003.  
107 Keith Meyer CMS Energy’s Vice President of Marketing. “It might be cheaper for us to import 
LNG than to develop these reserves,” he speculates. And even if legislation to open places like the Alaska 
National Wildlife Refuge was passed users would not see that gas for several years, due to political grid 
lock and the need for new pipelines to transport the gas.” Ibid. p. 2. 
108 Energy bulletin.net. “Energy Bulletin: Other Energy Headlines,” September 27, 2005. available 
from http://www.energybulletin.net/9216.html, Last accessed October 7, 2005. 
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normal capacities.109 Hurricane Katrina is an example of the supply constricting effect 
these weather systems can have on the U.S. gas market. Gas futures prices spiked from 
$1.52 in October to a new high of $12.66, the largest hike on record in response to the 
news that Hurricane Rita was headed for the Gulf. When the storm did pass it caused the 
shut in of 8.05 billion cubic feet of gas and high prices. 
 
Table 8. Imports of LNG into the U.S. 2003 by Source, in Billions of Cubic meters 
(From: Source BP Statistical Review, Taken from Oil and Gas Journal /January 
24, 2005 
 
 T &T Oman Qatar Algeria Nigeria Malaysia Total 
US 10.71 0.24 0.39 1.51 1.42 0.08 14.35 
 
The last area that affects supply is the state of development worldwide. Most of 
the other source countries’ infrastructure is still in development. Another factor is that the 
U.S. does not enjoy positive international relations with some of the potential source 
countries like Venezuela, Iran, and Libya.110 Increasing supply from these countries 
comes along with considerable political considerations and opposition from lobby 
groups, particularly human rights and pro-democracy lobby groups. What makes supply 
from Trinidad critical is that it is close and that it has the most infrastructure and capacity 
in place to meet U.S. shortfalls quickly as illustrated in Table 8. 
H. IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 
The U.S. natural gas market is highly responsive to supply changes because 
supply mechanisms are limited as highlighted above. A reduction in the normal supply 
chain from Trinidad and Tobago, (which could be caused by a terrorist attack) in the face 
of rapidly growing demand will drive up prices radically. 
                                                 
109 Heather Timmons and Vikas Bajaj “BP Details its Damage from Hurricanes,’ The New York 
Times, October 5, 2005. Available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/05/business/05oil.html?ex=1131163200&en=eaa45b4ccdf06424&ei=50
95&partner=REPRISE&excamp=reprise_engine=google_kw=natural_gas_ag=B_BP_Details_Damages_Fr
om_Hurricane_cn=100505, Last accessed October 12, 2005. 
110 On July 24, 2001 an Iranian warship threatened a BP oil exploration ship which it claimed was in 
Iranian waters. “Chronology of World Oil Market Events 1970-2003.” Available from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/chro.html, Last accessed October 3, 2005. 
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“Shipping costs, which vary with distance, add to the cost of LNG. Tankers must 
offload their cargo within a certain period of time, since a percentage of the extremely 
cold liquid burns off each day, making long hauls at sea unprofitable.”111 Alternate 
suppliers112 like Nigeria and Algeria will be more expensive alternatives because of the 
increased insurance costs involved: increased distance to market, delays in bumping up 
production to meet U.S. demand and possible increased security costs (see Table 9 for a 
comparison of prices from different suppliers.). 
Undoubtedly, if supplies of LNG from Trinidad and Tobago are curtailed due to a 
terrorist attack, replacement supplies will cost more, take longer to procure, and will 
originate from riskier climates.113  
 
Table 9. Shipping Prices to U.S. LNG Terminals (dollar per Mmbtu) (From: EIA 
Global LNG Study except Gas Supply (Taken from Oil & Gas Journal, May 17, 
2004, p. 57) 
 
From  To Shipping Regasification Liquefaction Gas Supply Total 
Trinidad Elba Is., Ga 0.32 0.30 1.09 1.00 2.71 
Trinidad Everett, Mass. 0.35 0.30 1.00 1.00 2.74 
Trinidad Cove Point 0.35 0.30 1.00 1.00 2.74 
Trinidad Lake Charles, La 0.38 0.30 1.09 1.00 2.77 
Algeria Cove Point 0.57 0.30 1.09 1.00 2.96 
Norway Cove Point 0.61 0.30 ? 1.00 3.00 
Algeria Lake Charles, La 0.72 0.30 1.09 1.00 3.11 
Nigeria Lake Charles, La 0.93 0.30 1.09 1.00 3.32 
Qatar Lake Charles, La 1.58 0.30 1.00 1.00 3.97 
NW 
Australia 
Lake Charles, La 1.84 0.30 1.09 1.00 4.23 
 
                                                 
111 “For contracted gas, unit prices are derived from nautical distances. The more days it takes the 
vessel to travel to arrive at its destination, the higher the unit costs….Project closer to major consuming 
markets will have a cost advantage over those more distant, since they will be paying less for shipping.” 
Henry Lee. “Dawning of a New Era: The LNG Story,” Environment and Natural Resources Program 
(ENRP) Discussion Paper 2005-07, Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA). John F. 
Kennedy School of Government. Cambridge, MA: April 2005. 
112 “Canada, which contributes about 94% of all gas imports, will probably be unable to boost its 
exports enough to keep up with increasing U.S. demand, according to the Canadian Gas Potential 
Committee. Production in Alberta, which accounts for 85% of the country’s gas output, is expected to peak 
in 2003 and then decline by 2% annually from 2005 to the end of this decade.” Wanda Avila “Electric 
Perspectives: The Tide Rises for LNG,” March/April 2002. Available from 
http://www.eei.org/magazine/editorial_content/nonav_stories/2002-03-01-tide.htm Last accessed 
September 28, 2005. 
113 Ibid. “That usually means LNG imports from Trinidad, which is 2200 miles away from the same 
terminal, are more attractive than imports from Algeria, 3,800 miles away.”  
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It took approximately 21 days for the U.S. Coast Guard to lift its ban on LNG 
tankers entering the Everett LNG facility in Boston after the events of September 11th.114 
If a significant attack were to occur in Trinidad and Tobago it is certain that local 
operations will be halted for a similar period until an investigation can be carried out. It is 
also highly likely that a temporary, ban, restriction, or some protocol, will be 
implemented at U.S. destination ports for tankers inbound from Trinidad. 
Costs will also increase because of delays in activating the storage and reserve 
systems. Should the attack occur during the winter months, it is likely that the market 
prices will spike significantly in this high demand period.115 The LNG market is evolving 
and long-term contracts are giving way to more spot cargoes. Twenty five percent of the 
gas imported into the U.S. is on a spot cargo basis, because of the variable fluctuations in 
demand described above. This speculative factor in the face of media coverage of the 
event will also drive up prices generally.116 Although there is more room for arbitrage, 
(that is shipments consigned to one port can be rerouted to another), this incurs additional 
costs and penalties for not fulfilling original contracts.117
U.S. LNG receiving terminals are located on the East (Boston) and South East 
coasts (Louisiana) and many storage facilities are located in this area. If an attack on the 
energy infrastructure is coordinated with an attack on pipeline grid that supplies gas in 
the US, Southwest and Western states will have to be fed by truck supply, which will 
 
114 Ibid. 
115 “For example a cold snap in February 2003 pushed prices on the East Coast to $20.00 per mbtu, 
nearly tripled the $7.22 price in Wyoming.” Joint Economic Committee, Chairman Robert F. Bennet: The 
pressures on Natural Gas Prices, October 6, 2004. Stephen Brown, “U.S. Natural Gas Markets in Turmoil,” 
Testimony Prepared for a Hearing on the Scientific Inventory of Oil and Gas Resources on Federal Lands: 
The Sub Committee on resources U.S. House of Representatives, Thursday, June, 19, 2003. 
116 On October 12 2000 Henry Hub natural gas price hit a record high of $5.78 BTU after reports 
circulated of a terrorist attack on the USS Cole. U.S. Department of Energy. Energy information Agency, 
“Chronology of World Oil Market Events 1970-2003,” Available from 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/chro.html, Last accessed October 3, 2005.  
117 Chris Neil, “2003 shows spot cargoes, tankers dictate U.S. LNG supplies, not terminal capacities,” 
Oil & Gas journal Vol. 102 Iss. 14, p. 70 The current capacity of the four existing terminals are Everett, 
Massachusetts; Cove point, Maryland; Elba island, Georgia; and Lake Charles Louisiana totals 3.72 Bcf of 
deliverability. a. Refits to the Elba island and Lake Charles facilities will add another 1.34 Bcf but are not 
expected to be on line in the near term. Only three new facilities have been approved, Cameron, Freeport, 
and Sabine. Located along the Gulf coast. These and eight others in the filing process for authorization are 
not expected to be on line for a number of years. 
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further drive up prices in additional costs. There is no Strategic Reserve of Gas so such a 
situation will be most difficult to recover from.118
Natural Gas prices hikes, increased security and insurance costs in the petroleum 
industry, and temporary myopia could cause hikes in oil prices and thus affect the entire 
economic system. A recent U.S. Economic Statistics Administration study “The 
Macroeconomic Effects of High Natural Gas Prices,” in 2005 produced the following 
simulations, which appear as Tables 10 and 11. They highlight the negative effects of 
high prices on the U.S. economy. 
 
Table 10. Sectoral Price Impacts of Higher Natural Gas Prices (From: Inter Industry 
Economic Research Fund (INFORUM) Estimates Using LIFT Model Simulation) 
 
Cumulative % change from actual 
Sectors 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Agriculture, Forestry fisheries 0.63 1.18 1.23 1.41 1.55 
Mining 15.47 18.57 14.82 19.90 20.32 
Construction 0.08 0.30 0.41 0.67 0.83 
Manufacturing, non-durables 1.04 1.39 1.53 1.73 1.87 
Manufacturing, durables 0.87 1.07 0.87 1.21 1.42 
Transportation 0.12 0.28 0.50 0.70 0.80 
Utilizes 8.23 9.26 8.38 10.55 10.85 
Wholesale and retail trade -0.06 1.18 0.97 1.08 1.22 
Finance Insurance, real estate 0.52 0.99 1.06 1.24 1.37 









                                                 
118 Neal Adams, Terrorism& Oil. Tulsa. Pennwell: 2003, pp. 112, 113. 
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Table 11. Sectoral Employment Impacts of Higher Natural Gas Prices (From: 
INFORUM Estimates Using LIFT Simulation) 
Cumulative change from actual, Thousands of jobs. 
Sectors 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total Civilian jobs -306.0 -527.1 -563.6 -5.28.8 -518.2 
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries -9.9 -17.3 -17.9 -16.1 -15.7 
Mining -1.8 -0.2 -2.1 -2.7 -3.7 
Construction -13.1 -30.9 -81.0 -51.3 -48.0 
Manufacturing, non-durables -16.5 -34.9 -38.2 -37.6 -38.6 
Manufacturing, durables -14.0 -43.7 -58.4 -59.4 -51.6 
Transportation -3.6 -5.7 -7.5 -7.6 -6.8 
Utilities 1.9 16.5 7.5 7.0 6.1 
Wholesale and retail trade -70.8 -145.5 -118.2 -112.7 -113.7 
Finance, insurance, real estate -37.0 -59.4 -49.6 -54.4 -56.8 
Services -141.2 -206.0 -198.2 -194.0 -189.4 
In another study, Brown119 suggests that oil and natural gas prices have a 
tendency to move together and thus, increase in natural gas prices could correlate to an 
increase in oil prices, which will also increase the inflationary cycle catalyzed by a 
terrorist attack on Trinidad and Tobago energy sector. 
In conclusion, the worse possible scenario, or from a different perspective the 
most opportune time for a terrorist to attack the energy infrastructure in Trinidad and 
Tobago is during the winter season in the United States, when a major hurricane is 
simultaneously moving across the Gulf of Mexico from the Caribbean. This is the time of 
greatest demand but least domestic production. It is possible that a hurricane could also 
disrupt ship movements and worsen the supply side of the equation. If this were 
                                                 
119 During previous oil shocks, natural gas and oil prices have generally moved together. Prices for 
other primary energy resources were relatively unchanged. Consequently, the measured effects of oil 
shocks may represent the combined effects of both oil and natural gas price movements. Natural gas 
accounts for about 40% of total oil and gas consumption, so 40 percent of the measured effect of an oil 
price shock may be a rough approximation of the effect of a natural gas price shock by itself. On that basis, 
a rough estimate is that sustained doubling of natural gas prices would reduce U.S. GDP by 0.6 to 2.1 
percent below what it would otherwise be. Stephen Brown, “U.S. Natural Gas Markets in Turmoil,” 
Testimony Prepared for a Hearing on the Scientific Inventory of Oil and Gas Resources on Federal Lands: 
The Sub Committee on resources U.S. House of Representatives, Thursday, June 19, 2003. 
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coordinated with an attack on the pipeline system within the United States, this would 
significantly increase the effects of the attack and be the worse possible scenario. The 
next two years (2005-2007) are perhaps the most critical period for such and attack. Most 
LNG plants in Algeria and Nigeria and the planned new receiving terminals in the United 
States will not be on line until this time. 
David Gold (2004) says that terrorist groups also behave in a similar cost 
constrained manner and look for opportunities to maximize their opportunity costs. 
“Terrorists groups behave as if they are cost constrained, and therefore choose tactics 
they believe to be cost effective. “If the relative costs of one avenue over another are 
raised, or the perceived benefits change, timing and tactics can also change in 
response.”120 Trinidad and Tobago, because of the vulnerability of its asset infrastructure, 
lack of adequate maritime surveillance, and connection to the United States, provides 
terrorists with a low cost attack scenario (less costs in defeating deterrence systems) but 
high cost in consequences to the local, regional and their ultimate target the U.S. 
economy. An attack in Trinidad and Tobago will possibly kill U.S. citizens (expatriate 
workers), destroy returns on considerable U.S. investment and affect the entire economic 
system through increased gas prices. The calculations at the beginning of this chapter 
show the high cost that can be incurred from a low cost terrorist attack on an offshore 
platform. It illustrates the importance of security in these sparsely patrolled areas, and I 
have shown the comparison in costs of how much less it is in opportunity costs to provide 
the basic platforms to conduct surveillance in this sector. If an attack occurs in Trinidad’s 
energy sector today, not only will it disrupt the supply of vital resources and security 
services to the region in the short term, but it would also offset long term plans to acquire 
the tools to ensure its security in the future. Finally the limited supply mechanisms that 
are presently available to feed U.S. demand should be noted. These are at the heart of the 
cause of high prices in the U.S. market. An attack that removes Trinidad, will further 
 
120 Former United States Central Intelligence Agency agent Robert Baer contends that Al Qaeda is 
watching the after effects of Hurricane Katrina and Rita. “Yet precisely because of the shortages brought on 
by that storm and the damage still being counted from Hurricane Rita, Saudi Arabia is more important than 
ever to world oil supplies. What’s worse, according to several analysts, Al Qaeda knows it. There are 
watching Katrina, They’re watching Rita. They’re watching what it is doing to the United States.” 
Christopher Dickey “Saudi Storms,” Newsweek, October 3, 2005, p. 35. A similar situation exists with 
regards to LNG supplies from Trinidad and Tobago, which must be addressed.  
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worsen the supply equation. Additionally the higher costs associated with geographic 
distance in securing emergency supply in the industry dictate that the United States 
should take more interest in the security of its relatively cheap, and proximate main 
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V. THE EFFECT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY ON 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO’S STABILITY 
Trinidad and Tobago is a small island state. In small countries, meeting the 
challenges of globalization and transnational terrorism, is a constant struggle, which 
requires constant updates of equipment and training to defeat these morphing threats.121 
Challenged by limited resources and a plethora of development priorities, small nation 
states have to prioritize their responses to threats mainly along the lines of economic 
importance and feasibility. Economic and security assistance from larger developed 
nations is sometimes a necessary feature of these countries’ security plans. While 
Trinidad and Tobago can be considered wealthy relative to the others islands in the 
region, it still requires assistance from larger developed countries in order to modernize 
and develop its security forces. Moreover, Trinidad and Tobago is also the major supplier 
of liquefied natural gas to the United States and is thus an attractive target for terror.122 A 
low cost attack on Trinidad and Tobago’s energy sector could generate significant 
economic damage to both Trinidad and Tobago and the United States. 
Despite closer economic and energy ties, recent U.S. foreign policy aimed at 
Trinidad and Tobago, that is the termination of security assistance, the curtailment of 
joint security operations and exercises, and a termination of U.S. funded military  
 
121 Both Deere, and Gutteridge, and Thomas have illustrated the connection between U.S. Policy, aid, 
and security in the Caribbean during the Cold War and pre-September 11, 2001. They have all linked 
dependency, debt crisis, and economic difficulties to the development of conditions that facilitate 
corruption, crime, and in some cases revolution (Grenada 1983). These inadequate policies have caused the 
United States to intervene in the region several times within the last twenty years: in Grenada 1983, 
Panama 1989, and Haiti (1995, 2003). Carmen Deere, et al. “In the shadows of the Sun” ‘Caribbean 
Development alternatives and U.S. Policy.’ Colorado: Westview Press. 1990 and William Gutteridge & 
Desmond Thomas. “The Commonwealth Caribbean” ’Planning for Stability.’ “Prospects for Economic 
development’ & ‘Lessons from the Caribbean.’ Washington: The Centre for Security and Conflict Studies. 
1989.  
122 “Growing resentment over social and economic traumas induced by globalization is aimed at the 
United States, because oil is viewed as the primary motive for American involvement in these areas, and 
because the giant U.S. oil corporations are seen as the very embodiment of American power, anything to do 
with oil-pipelines, wells, refineries, loading platforms-is seen by insurgents as a legitimate and attractive 
target for attack; hence the raids on the pipelines in Iraq, on company offices in Saudi Arabia, and on oil 
tankers in Yemen.” Michael Klare Blood & Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing 
Petroleum Dependency, New York: Metropolitan/Henry Holt, 2005.  
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education and training programs for the Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force officers in 
the United States, reduces Trinidad and Tobago’s ability to secure this mutually 
important sector. 
In this chapter I will highlight the unintended consequences of U.S. foreign policy 
instruments on Trinidad and Tobago’s stability. I will highlight the negative effects 
recent U.S. counter-drug and counter-terror policy has had on Trinidad and Tobago. I will 
also look at a specific U.S. foreign policy instrument the American Serviceman’s 
Protection Act, and how it has acted as a barrier to Trinidad and Tobago in accessing 
counter-terrorism training and thus its ability to secure its vital energy sector. Lastly, I 
will look at recommendations for both Trinidad and Tobago and the United States for 
harmonizing bilateral diplomatic initiatives in such a way to mitigate this mutual threat.  
A. THE EFFECTS OF U.S. COUNTER-DRUG POLICY ON TRINIDAD AND 
TOBAGO 
The island’s location places it between major narcotics producers in South 
America and the insatiable demand for drugs by consumers in the United States and 
North America. Close observation123 reveals that the island state is presently caught up in 
a maelstrom of drug smuggling-induced crime. This surge in criminal activity, which 
includes illegal arms shipments, fully occupies the local security force’s attention and 
resources. This surge in crime also contributes to the present instability by providing 
arms to criminal organizations. This type of environment would also make it easier for a 
larger attack by transnational groups while the local security forces are thoroughly 
engaged.  
It can also be argued that U.S. counter-drug policy is contributing to an increase 
in drug trafficking activity around Trinidad and Tobago and this is contributing to 
deteriorating security in the nation generally. Presidential Defense Directive number 
fourteen in 1993 redirected United States drug control policy focus out of the Caribbean 
and on to Latin America, specifically Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. The U.S. pull out of 
the region has caused two main effects an upsurge in trafficking in the region as 
traffickers move thorough Venezuela and Trinidad and up the Eastern Caribbean 
 
123 The deteriorating crime situation in Trinidad and Tobago is highlighted in Chapter III. 
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chain.124 The fact that the coastal areas of Venezuela are impoverished, (mainly run 
down fishing villages) lightly patrolled and prone to illegal activity has made this the 
route of choice.125 It was reported in the U.S. State Department’s International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Bureau’s 2002 International Drug control report for Venezuela: 
Another outstanding example of law enforcement cooperation was an 
August 2002 investigation that made possible a combined operation in 
September 2002, “Golfo de Paria” In this operation, the Venezuelan 
National Guard, the Venezuelan Prosecutor’s Drug Task Force (PDTF), 
and DEA targeted the Mario Sanchez (AKA Leon Cachito) narcotics 
trafficking organization, which was responsible for smuggling multi-ton 
loads of cocaine into the U.S. each month. With a day’s notice, the 
operation went into action, by the end of the week concluding with the 
arrest of Sanchez and 15 co-defendants and the seizure of two tons of 
cocaine, 16 “go-fast” boats, 40 high-powered outboard motors, two fishing 
vessels, and various real estate.126
The result is that, invariably, arms shipments and narcotic shipments occur 
simultaneously in the same illegal run. It has been this increased traffic by smugglers and 
increasing use of arms to commit crime that has focused the Government’s priority on 
updating, and increasing the nations maritime security assets as its main response to this 
increase in crime. Increasingly, Venezuelan and Colombian nationals have been arrested 
in Trinidad and Tobago in connection with cocaine seizures.  
 
 
124 “Mr. Speaker, in discussions with our international partners, it was indicated that the southern and 
eastern Caribbean, including T&T, could expect to see increased levels of drug transshipment. This is due 
to the effects of plan Colombia and a joint UK-Jamaica programme referred to in, Jamaica as Operation 
King Fish of anti trafficking, which has resulted in increased displacements and redirection of drug 
trafficking. “Statement of the Honorable Minister of National Security Martin Joseph. Source: Shirley 
Bahadur, “Joseph committed to crime fight,” Trinidad Guardian online, October 12, 2005. Available from 
http://www.guardian.co.tt/archives/2005-10-14/news16.html, Last accessed November 22, 2005.  
125 Between 26 and 28 July 2005, to be precise, a delegation from the Ministry of National Security 
visited my counterparts in Venezuela to deal with the transshipment of drugs from Venezuela through 
Trinidad, up North. Mr. Speaker, we were extremely concerned because three bordering states that were 
being used as transshipment facilities: Sucre State, Delta Amacuro (and) Guiria. Ibid. 
126 “The Drug Trade in the Caribbean 2003,” A Threat Assessment. (section on Trinidad & Tobago) 
Office of Strategic Intelligence. Caribbean Strategic Intelligence Unit DEA 030, September 4, 2003. Golfo 
de Paria or Gulf of Paria, refers to the body of water which separates Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. 
At the closest point between the two countries this body of water measures just seven miles. The DEA 
operation highlighted above took place near Macuro an isolated and impoverished area, some nine miles 
from Trinidad and Tobago. 
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This increase of Venezuelan and Colombian “visitors” also contributes to 
increasing crime levels domestically because of the potential for violence, criminal 
expertise, dirty money, recruitment of accomplices and corruption that come along with 
their visits: 
DEA officials in the Caribbean Division have expressed concern and 
worry over the bolder efforts of FARC guerillas to ship cocaine to the U.S. 
using several Caribbean countries as transshipment points. Trinidad in 
recent years has become much popular transshipment point because of the 
lack of security on the water, the agent said.127
The Government has realized that illegal guns have been reported in the majority 
of crimes and has fixed the illegal gun and drug trade as one of its key strategies to 
curbing crime. To this strategy it has committed the Defense Force in large counter-
smuggling operations. On Tuesday, August 23, 2005, the Trinidad and Tobago Coast 
Guard’s Special Naval Unit carried out a joint operation with Western Division 
policemen from the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, and intercepted a Venezuelan 
vessel in local waters. The unit then subsequently raided a vacation home on Monos 
Island just one mile off Trinidad’s westernmost point. The SNU operation resulted in the 
largest seizure of cocaine in the island’s history: 1.75 tons of cocaine hydrochloride. Two 
local men, five Venezuelans, and one Antiguan were detained along with two automatic 
rifles, (a FN SLR and a Colt AR 180), four handguns, an Israeli Uzi sub machine gun, 
and two hundred and forty seven rounds of assorted ammunition. The vessel and 
Venezuelan nationals all came from Guiria, the closest large town on the Venezuelan side 
of the Gulf of Paria.128  
In summary, U.S. counter-drug policy, by concentrating on Colombia has caused 
traffickers to push their operations eastward into Venezuela. Venezuela does not share 
 
127 Mark Bassant “T&T Drug Dealers Linked to Colombian Guerillas,” Trinidad Express On Line. 
September 21, 2005. Available from http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article_news?id=103094391, 
Last accessed October 4, 2005. 
128 This highly dangerous but successful operation came close on the heels of another interception 
made on the heels of another TTCG coordinated interception carried out some three hundred miles off the 
East Coast of Trinidad. French Navy and Venezuelan Armed Forces assets assisted by aerial units of the 
TTCG seized approximately three tons of cocaine aboard a Venezuelan registered fishing vessel Darryl 
Heeralal, “Biggest Drug Bust Ever,” Trinidad Express On Line, August 24, 2005. Available from 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article?id=97704391, Last accessed October 4, 2005. 
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good relations or cooperation with U.S. counter-drug efforts and this allows the trade to 
fester. Trinidad and Tobago, its eastward neighbor, therefore, has also experienced an 
upsurge in illegal activity that has tended to destabilize the nation and the steady flow of 
arms has increased the threat of terrorism generally. 
B. THE EFFECTS OF U.S. COUNTER-TERROR POLICY ON TRINIDAD 
AND TOBAGO  
The U.S./TT signing of the Ship Rider Act in 1996 had made it possible for 
United States Coast Guard vessels to patrol the local waters of Trinidad and Tobago with 
Trinidad and Tobago personnel on board. This was coupled to several annual 
deployments of U.S. Coast Guard cutters, U.S. Navy Special Boat Units and Seal Teams 
to do pre-deployment training and counter-terror and counter-drug training with local 
forces. September the 11th has negated these positive notes. Joint operations have been 
routinely canceled including the annual Operation Carib Venture and other spontaneous, 
intelligence driven, joint maritime counter-drug exercises. USCG vessel port calls in 
Trinidad and Tobago have been reduced from an average of six (operational maritime 
security deployments) between 1996 and 2001 to bi-annual visits of the Caribbean 
Support Tender,129 which hosts a multinational crew of which Trinidad and Tobago is the 
largest contributor  
Patrols and surveillance by U.S. Law enforcement and military assets have been 
significantly reduced in the Caribbean post September 11, 2001. Redirection of U.S. 
assets to a homeland and border security posture has contributed to increased illegal 
traffic in the Southern Caribbean. In a recent United Nations sponsored report of drug 
trafficking in the Caribbean,130 it is highlighted that after September 11, 2001, some 400 
and other(?) FBI agents assigned to counter-drug operations in the region were 
immediately reassigned. Seventy five percent of the U.S. assets (intelligence officers, 
cutters, helicopters and aircraft) were redirected to the United States from their patrol 
duties in the Caribbean to protect ports, coastal power stations, nuclear facilities, oil 
 
129 A 180 foot, 12 knot buoy tender, whose primary mission is logistic support and training to the 
small Coast Guards in the Eastern Caribbean.  
130 Caribbean Drug Trends 2001-2002 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Caribbean 
Regional Office, Bridgetown Barbados, WI, February 2003. 
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tankers and cruise ships entering U.S. ports. In summary, the redirection of assets 
according to the report has resulted in the overwhelming use of maritime routes by 
smugglers, weapons traffickers, and illegal immigrants in high-speed craft. The result of 
this increased traffic for Trinidad has been an increase in illegal arms trafficking, 
domestic crime, and in a potential increase in the terrorist threat to its energy sector. Lack 
of surveillance assets by local forces and a reduced U.S. presence has made it very easy 
for criminals, terrorists, and their international sponsors to organize, equip, and commit 
groups to terrorist or criminal acts within the maritime boundaries of Trinidad and 
Tobago. 
In “Strengthening America’s Southern Flank Requires a Better Effort,” James 
Carafano131 calls for a revitalization of the U.S. military’s Southern Command. He calls 
for more joint exercises and an overhaul of the security assistance legislation. He stresses 
that this is key in providing advanced training to the Caribbean and Latin American 
countries so that they can become better partners in the war on terror. In “Making the Sea 
Safer”132 he calls on the U.S. Maritime security apparatus to become better at winning 
“away games” through developing the “playing field,” and through security regimes and 
partnerships in developing countries, in order to foster economic development and 
security. He also sums up the issue very aptly: 
U.S. policy makers must sort out and clarify America’s approach to 
hemispheric threats while persuading multinational forums on regional 
security to develop a new basis for achieving that goal. Failure to move 
forward on such an agenda will give terrorists and criminals the upper 
hand.133  
The U.S. needs to increase its presence in the Caribbean to secure its vital energy 
security interests. Trinidad and Tobago’s dominance in LNG export makes it no different 
than other suppliers of energy to the United States. It deserves better security and security 
 
131 He also asserts that increased attacks at sea have increased insurance premiums by approximately 
16 billion dollars. 
132 James Carafano, “Making the Sea Safer, A National Agenda for Maritime Security and Counter 
Terrorism.” Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2005.  
133 James Carafano, “Strengthening America’s Southern Flank Requires a Better Effort.” Washington: 
The Heritage Foundation, 2004. 
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cooperation than what exists at present. What is required is the same level of cooperation 
that the United States practices with other vital sources of energy. In both the Aegean Sea 
and Mediterranean, the U.S. (along with the European Union) has built up standing forces 
and signed agreements to ensure the safety of oil and gas tankers and infrastructure.134 
U.S. servicemen are engaged in petroleum infrastructure protection in Colombia, Saudi 
Arabia, the Republic of Georgia, and in maritime surveillance operations to protect 
offshore installations in the Persian Gulf,135 Arabian Sea, South China Sea, Nigeria,136 
and Kazakhstan. 
When requesting funds in 2004 to establish a ‘rapid–reaction brigade’ in Kazakhstan, 
for example, the State department told Congress such a force is needed to ‘enhance’ 
Kazakhstan’s capability to respond to major terrorist threats to oil platforms in the 
Caspian Sea.137
Finally Rear Admiral Chris Ames, USN highlighted that the U.S. Navy maintains 
a permanent Expeditionary Strike Group (some 3000 sailors and marines) and patrol 
boats from the U.S. Coast Guard off Iraq’s Southern Coast to protect threatened offshore 
 
134 An appreciable increase in the flow of oil and gas through the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean 
is expected to require the constant presence of U.S. and allied forces at some level. Daniel Whiteneck, 
“Energy Terrorism and Organized Crime,” Western Policy Center, 2005. 
135 The first combat operation of the war in Iraq was conducted by the U.S. Navy Seals seized two 
Iraqi platforms and, since then, several thousand U.S. and British troops have been tied up securing Iraqi oil 
infrastructure from insurgent attacks. U.S. military training assistance and equipment grants to Nigeria are 
closely related to the fact that in the future up to 25% of American imports could come from Nigeria and a 
similar situation for Kazakhstan. Michael Klare, Blood & Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of 
America’s Growing Petroleum Dependency. New York: Metropolitan/Henry Holt, 2005 
136 Recently Al Qaeda threats to the oil and gas operations in Nigeria have prompted renewed U.S. 
military interest in the region. Al Qaeda had reportedly made a direct threat against the presence of U.S. oil 
companies in the country. The United States is conducting a 5 year, $100 million program wherein African 
countries that have substantial oil reserves receive counter-terrorism and oil protection training. This 
includes Exercise Flintlock a multi national operation involving African militaries in joint counter-terror 
training. Eric Watkins “Bin Laden and Oil Markets,” Oil and Gas Journal. June 27, 2005, Vol. 103.24, p. 
29.  
137 Assisting regional partners to maintain the maritime sovereignty of their territorial seas and 
internal waters is a longstanding objective of the United States and contributes directly to the partners' 
economic development as well as their ability to combat unlawful or hostile exploitation by a variety of 
threats. The National Maritime Strategy of the United States Washington: The White House, March 8, 
2005, p. 13. 
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petroleum platforms.138 This is the type of cooperation needed in the Southern Caribbean 
to protect Trinidad and Tobago’s and the United States’ mutual energy interests. 
C. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT CONTROVERSY 
In August 2003, U.S. State Department officials announced that all aid and 
training assistance would be cut to Trinidad and Tobago. This was prompted because of 
Trinidad and Tobago’s refusal to sign a bilateral waiver exempting United States military 
personnel from prosecution by the International Criminal Court. Trinidad and Tobago’s 
former President ANR Robinson is credited as one of the architects and driving forces 
behind the implementation of this international court, so it would be difficult for Trinidad 
to capitulate to U.S. wishes and change its position on this issue.1 Interestingly the chief 
prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno Ocampo, is Argentinean. 
Argentina has not signed a Bilateral Immunity Agreement with the United States, yet it is 
not subject to the ban on security assistance from the United States. (see Table 12) 
While it can be argued the nominal figure in Table 12 allocated to Trinidad and 
Tobago is not very large, and that Trinidad and Tobago is small enough and rich enough 
to fund its own training at other institutions, there is still the question of access. Visas can 
be approved quickly and processed through the U.S. Military Liaison Office of the 
Embassy. The U.S. International Military Education and Training information system is 
also a vital system in terms of information about upcoming courses, update courses, 
course availability, and scheduling. Accessing institutions on a one-on-one basis is time 
consuming, inefficient, and costly. U.S. offered courses also come with built in lodging at 







138 Rear Admiral Christopher C. Ames, Commander, Amphibious Group Three “Fresh Perspectives 
from the Arabian Gulf: Expeditionary Strike Group Five,” –Secretary of the Navy Guest Lecture: U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School, August 8, 2005.  
Table 12. The Disposition in Relation to Article 98 of the Latin American and 
Caribbean Countries (From: United States, Bureau of Resource Management) 
 
 
It must also be noted from Table 13 that other vital areas of aid like the 
HIV/AIDS assistance has also been cut and funds have to be redirected to these areas too, 





Table 13. U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Caribbean FY 2005 Estimates and FY 2006 
Requests (From: Figures Drawn from Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign 
Operations, Summary Tables Fiscal Year 2006. U.S. Department of State) 
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Total 2005 51.81 42.29 52.52 60.52 37.70 3.64 2.47 3.38 115.26 369.59 
Total 2006 28.85 37.89 68.36 74.00 32.53 3.74 16.50 9.35 45.04 316.26 
Key  
DA-Development Assistance 
CSH –Child Survival and Health Program Fund 
GHAI? 
ESF- Economic Support Fund 
PL 480-Food Assistance Program 
IMET-International Military Education and Training 
INCLE- International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 




In essence, military education and training is much cheaper and efficient using the 
U.S. system. Many of the operating systems used by the security agencies of Trinidad 
and Tobago are of U.S. origin and this makes access to affordable U.S. training essential. 
Acquiring substitute systems and training in European is also problematic. This is due to 
the expense of accessing quality maritime military training in traditional areas like the 
United Kingdom. The proximity; convenience; lower cost; and the opportunity to learn 
the common procedures, technology, protocols, and systems of the very units they will 
interact with in securing the region make U.S. training the logical choice.  
In summary, the sanctions imposed by the U.S. with reference to the ICC has 
made it harder for the local security forces to access quality military and security training. 
The net result is that this has ultimately reduced its ability to secure an area of vital 
interest to U.S. energy security strategy and economy. 
Prior to the Article 98 controversy Trinidad and Tobago enjoyed extremely good 
relations with the United States and this relationship strengthened regional security. In 
March 2002, the United States Coast Guard’s Greater Antilles section officially requested 
that the Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard conduct a counter-drug patrol in an area of 
their responsibility (off Puerto Rico) for the month of April 2002, while its resources 
were deployed on surged Homeland Defense missions. TTS Nelson, the flagship of the 
Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard with a local Special Forces detachment carried out this 
mission. The TTCG had also recently begun joining U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement 
Detachments, in keeping with the Ship Rider Act, to prosecute counter-narcotic and terror 
missions outside of the islands’ territorial boundaries. These were prior to the ICC 
controversy. In the new diplomatic environment, little to no joint operations take place.  
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Table 14. U.S. Aid to Trinidad and Tobago Prior to Article 98 and After (From: 
Center for International Policy Online139) 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Anti Terrorism assistance  0 0 0 0 0 
International Military education and training 0.12 0.13 0.15 0 0.5 
Joint Cooperative Engagement Training, 
exchanges and unspecified *(No. of iterations) 
93* 56* 13* 0 0 
Foreign military sales (Govt. to Govt. sales of 
defense articles training and services) 
0.17 0.13 0.001 0 0 
Military and Police Aid 0.95 0.84 0.84 0.30 0.35 
All figures in millions of U.S. dollars 
Realist foreign policy has not produced positive results for the United States in its 
relations with Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad has not capitulated on the ICC issue based 
on pressure from the United States. Conversely, neither has interdependence produced 
cooperation as liberal theory would suggest. What is needed is a more constructive 
approach focused on the symbiotic interests of the two nations and in keeping with both 
countries’ stated foreign policy strategies and energy security interests.  
Spencer Abraham, U.S. Energy Secretary: 
American energy security policy must compliment and support America’s 
economic and foreign policy goals. This approach – looking to 
cooperation with the major producers and consumers – to handle 
challenges of the global energy market underscores the role of foreign 
policy in promoting energy security.140
                                                 
139 Center for International Policy Online Available from http://ciponline.org/facts/tt.htm, Last 
accessed October 4, 2005. 
140 Spencer Abraham, “Challenges to Economic Security.” Economic Perspectives. Available from 
http://www.usinfo.state.gov/journals/journals.htm, Last Accessed August 30, 2005.  
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Based on Trinidad and Tobago’s role in promoting security and stability in both 
the Caribbean region and the Third Border area of the United States, and its key role in 
the Energy Security strategy of the United States, it should be given a waiver on national 
security grounds for a country that is a proactive and cooperative energy and security 
partner.141  
If the United States does change its present security assistance policy, it has also 
to radically change the type of assistance it grants, in order to meet the current growing 
threat. Prior to the Article 98 controversy, the U.S. Government donated four 82-foot 
patrol boats between 1999-2002 and two C 26 aircraft, as well as other minor equipment 
support in the form of computers and narcotic test kits to Trinidad and Tobago. These 
vessels were considered obsolete both in the United States and by its grateful recipients, 
(all in excess of 35 years old). They were slow and were not suited to rough local waters 
as a stable law enforcement platform. The problem has always been the unsuitability and 
inadequacy of gifts to be meaningful tools in security operations. Trinidad and Tobago 
has long had access to the latest technology as used in the petrochemical sector.142 This 
access to technology since the late 1960’s has led to a technologically savvy society and 
this use of the latest technology pervades the government apparatus. The U.S. State 
Department has traditionally lumped donations of equipment to the entire Caribbean 
region together.143 Low technology gifts, which may be effective in other islands, are a 
source of frustration in Trinidad and Tobago (the 82 footer patrol vessels donated 
between 1999-2001 are a case in point). Large sums of money are spent in upgrading 
these vessels locally, and further large sums in trying to keep them operational.144 This 
only exacerbates the law enforcement dilemma of keeping operational units on station to 
 
141 Section B NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER – The President may, without prior notice to 
Congress, waive the prohibition of subsection (a) with respect to a particular country if he determines and 
reports to the appropriate congressional committees that it is important to the national interest of the United 
States to waive such prohibition.” Extract of American Serviceman’s Protection Act ASPA. Available from 
http://hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/bilateralagreements.pdf, Last accessed October 14, 2005. 
142 This includes the latest navigational, dynamic positioning, and production software and 
technology. {in the detection and recording of oil and gas wells} Source: NEAP involvement. 
143 See last four columns of Table 15. 
144 A quarterly status report is required by the U.S. Embassy in Port of Spain, on all donated 
equipment and further donations can be affected by these reports. This encourages the prolonged use of 
inadequate resources. 
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deny access by smugglers, and challenges the budgets available for the acquisition of new 
equipment. United States donated equipment has either been uneconomical to run, low 
technology, or outdated equipment in the United States military system. 
It is significant that TTS Nelson (which was bought from the United Kingdom by 
the GOTT and upgraded locally) is the type of capability that is requested by the U.S. to 
patrol its waters. This illustrates the utility and value of donated gifts. Trinidad and 
Tobago requires modern equipment to ensure the security of its energy sector, see Table 
16. 
 
Table 15. Equipment and Training Required to Secure the Maritime Domain of 
Trinidad and Tobago 
 
 Equipment type Type of training 
Generic     
Strategic Intelligence data base 
software 















Tactical Night vision 
equipment 
High definition 











    







places at War 






















Re deployment of 
assets in the region 
for joint exercises 
Energy 
Specific 
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 Equipment type Type of training 
Generic     
Strategic  Remote submersible 
vehicle for pipeline 
monitoring. 
Threat alert 









missions to Iraq to 




















Platform Safety Platform 
familiarization 
JIATF- Joint Inter Agency Task Forces 
JTF6- Joint Task Force 6 
SIGINT-Signals intelligence 
UAV- Unmanned aerial vehicle (surveillance) 
FIBUA- Fighting In Built Up Areas (Shugart and Gordon facility) 
MOUT- Military operations in urban terrain. 
 
In conclusion, U.S. foreign policy towards Trinidad and Tobago appears to be 
punitive toward an ally that supports the U.S. economic and security interests. While 
Trinidad and Tobago cannot dictate the counter-drug policy of the United States, it can 
clearly point out how it affects the stability of Trinidad and Tobago. The Government of 
Trinidad and Tobago can also request assistance to combat the unintended negative 
consequences of U.S. policy, such as the rising crime levels in Trinidad and Tobago. 
There is some scope also for de-confliction of the various U.S. foreign policy 
instruments, so that, combined, they do not inadvertently destabilize Trinidad and Tobago 
and simultaneously place United States energy interests at risk. 
What is clearly needed is a waiver for Trinidad and Tobago with regard to the 
American Serviceman’s Protection Act (ICC issue). After this is achieved, radical 
adjustments are also required to the traditional type of U.S. security assistance and 
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cooperation provided to Trinidad and Tobago. The use of high technology and modern 
equipment in sufficient numbers, as highlighted in Table 15, is what is needed to enhance 




The Government of Trinidad and Tobago should immediately accelerate 
diversification of its economy away from heavy reliance on the energy sector. In order to 
safeguard itself from macroeconomic shocks that could result from disruptions in this 
sector, it must: a) develop the other promising features of its economy, such as tourism 
and non-petroleum exports, and b) expand its role as the finical center in the Caribbean to 
generate increased revenue in capital markets. 
In the meantime, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago needs to bolster its 
maritime forces to ensure the security of the maritime-based oil and gas industry. To do 
this it must address a long-standing issue by publishing a National Military Strategy. In 
order to ensure the most efficient, credible and sustainable security of this sector, this 
document should contain strategies to equip the TTCG with new equipment to provide 
credible law enforcement capability. New equipment would simultaneously combat the 
maritime borne drug trade, which contributes to high crime levels, possible acts of 
terrorism and low investment confidence. The document should also address strategies to 
procure training and state of the art equipment for the Trinidad and Tobago Defense 
Force/ Coast Guard Special Naval Unit so that it can conduct credible maritime counter-
terrorism operations within the energy sector. Since the wider Caribbean region is also 
dependent on Trinidad and Tobago for the supply of petroleum resources, financial 
services, communications and military support, the document should also address the 
Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force’s role in the wider region.  
In conjunction with the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of National Security 
should create a National Energy security center to analyze worldwide terrorist incidents 
involving energy facilities. This center should provide research, modeling, and simulation 
capabilities in order to derive effective national responses to the threats posed to the local 
energy industry. Such a center could sponsor training for security forces on platform 
systems and critical nodes within the energy sector. It could also promote greater 
interface with the energy industry and the Defense Force, in terms of funding training, 
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information and technology exchange. The center should have a maritime energy 
emergency incident room to manage these incidents, as well. 
There is also a requirement for the Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of Energy to 
promote strategies that inculcate a maritime domain awareness culture in the sector (with 
legislation) that works in conjunction with the safety culture. The practice of arming 
platform standby vessels to act as deterrents to maritime attack should also be strongly 
considered. Such a practice does not violate the no-firearms policy enforced on platforms. 
 The Ministry should encourage the adoption of a Design Basis Threat system for 
construction of new offshore platforms in order to harden the national energy 
infrastructure against terrorist attack. It is also strongly recommended that the Ministry 
create legislation to enforce a national certificate and training program for specialized 
training for private security companies providing security personnel to critical energy 
facilities. This must be a mandatory requirement before personnel can be employed in 
security at energy facilities in order to ensure competent security procedures are followed 
at all critical installations. 
In order for the latest technology and techniques to be employed by the Trinidad 
and Tobago Defense Force, U.S. funding and security assistance needs to be resumed to 
Trinidad and Tobago to help secure the mutual energy interests of the United States and 
Trinidad and Tobago. U.S. sponsored anti-terror training on the latest technology and 
techniques, with a specific focus on the energy sector, is also required.  
Waivers are strongly recommended on U.S. broad-based, punitive, ICC related, 
foreign policy instruments that complicate the protection of U.S. security interests in the 
region. Once this is achieved both countries need to share real time intelligence on energy 
security matters. This intelligence cooperation needs to be supported by an increased 
presence of U.S. law enforcement assets in the sparsely patrolled outer limits of the EEZ 
to bolster local security efforts, in keeping with the Ship Rider Act. Local security efforts 
can also be enhanced by the transfer to the Southern Caribbean region of the same 
modern equipment and technology that is used in the United States to meet the evolving 
terrorist threats.  
 89
Finally, US assistance is also required in drafting legislative approaches 
(including recent precedents on Islamic charities funding issues) to amend local 
legislation (in Trinidad and Tobago) in the form of United States RICO laws; so that the 
Jamaat al Muslimeen as an entire organization can be targeted. At present, only 



























The government of Trinidad and Tobago must accept the urgent need to secure 
the country’s economic engine: the energy sector. The threats to the local energy industry 
are varied. They include depreciation of the investment climate by increased crime and 
violence, and a maritime based-terrorist attack. An attack on Trinidad and Tobago’s 
energy infrastructure will have a three-fold effect. It will significantly retard economic 
growth in the island, have debilitating effects on the region, and disrupt the U.S. energy 
supply, and economy. The events in Trinidad in 1990, and recent bombings in Port of 
Spain, dispel the myth that the region is safe from terrorism and will remain safe with 
reduced presence and assistance from the United States. The Government of Trinidad and 
Tobago must do its part in preparing and outlying its national military strategy and 
regional strategic objectives in a published document. This document must also clearly 
outline the steps needed to provide the military with a sustainable and credible energy 
security policy and analogous anti-terrorism strategy. The U.S. can assist in this regard by 
providing assistance for the democratic, legal, and thorough dismantling of the Jamaat Al 
Muslimeen whose continued existence does nothing to contribute to a safe, secure, and 
stable investment environment in Trinidad and Tobago. 
It is clear that the economies of the countries in the region are fragile, and an 
attack could have devastating effects on Trinidad and Tobago, the region, and the United 
States’ “Third Border.” The Haitian refugee crisis of yesteryear and the constant 
employment of the United States Coast Guard in illegal immigration barrier patrols may 
foreshadow the possible effects of deteriorating economic conditions in its backyard.  
It is also clear that the United States, the world’s largest consumer of energy and 
energy resources, has little choice but to become proactive in the security of energy 
resources in the regions that supply it. Interdependence and the transnational nature of 
terrorism make it vulnerable to attacks on energy resources both inside and outside the 
United States. The convenience and security of its energy relationship with Trinidad and 
Tobago cannot be taken for granted. Vigilance must be maintained, and the United States 
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must take on board (accept may be a better word) the growing incidence of maritime-
based attack and attacks within the industrial sector. It must empower its allies, not place 
barriers hindering them from upgrading their ability to prevent and repel terrorist attacks. 
No maritime security force in the region can match the United States’ ability to project 
military and effective law enforcement assets into the region, or sustain them logistically 
for prolonged periods. While this is an ideal solution to protect Trinidad’s large maritime 
sector, and the best way to secure the region from terror attack, it may not be politically 
or economically practical to either Government. It is possible that such an approach 
would not be understood or supported by the United States taxpayers, especially in the 
light of other pressing domestic economic issues, and the current considerable economic 
and security burden being carried in Iraq and Afghanistan. A cost effective and long-term 
alternative, in keeping with U.S. foreign policy and its National Defense and Maritime 
strategy, must then be selected. Security assistance, with equipment and training, is 
required to help Trinidad and Tobago’s maritime forces to undertake this mission more 
effectively, with the most modern equipment, training, and procedures. This however can 
only be achieved effectively if punitive diplomatic barriers are removed and security 
assistance funding is restored. The removal of the impediments must be accompanied by 
sporadic and spontaneous U.S. presence to consolidate security in remote adjacent 
maritime areas not routinely patrolled by regional forces through which an attack can be 
initiated. This can be achieved by information sharing, equipment grants, renewed 
bilateral security partnerships, and training regimens, to conduct a better surveillance 
mission at energy sources. These strategies also serve a two-fold purpose in securing 
against terrorism and drug trafficking, and in protecting U.S. consumers and, ultimately, 
its economy from escalating oil and gas prices. 
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APPENDIX A. ATTACKS ON THE IRAQI PETROLEUM 
INDUSTRY 
Date Incidents Remarks 
2003 
June 
5 attacks on (oil/gas) pipeline  In Kirkuk, Al Dawrah & Bayji refinery, 
Abbidiyah Gaarbiga, and Hit. IEDs on 
pipelines  
July 2 attacks on (oil /gas)pipeline In Basra and Bayji. IEDs on pipelines 
August 5 attacks on (oil/gas) pipeline  In Karbala, Bayji and Al Taji. IEDS and RPGS used. 
September 2 attacks on (oil/gas) pipeline  Kirkuk, and Jabour. IEDS used 
October 4 attacks on (oil/ gas)pipeline Hadeetha, Mosul and North Baghdad. IEDs used. 
November 
4 attacks on(oil/gas) pipeline  
 
1 attack on oil compound 
2 attacks on personnel 
Tikrit, Zumar, Mashruh al-Thertar, 
Kirkuk, Jambur and Sharqat. IEDS used. 
3 expatriate workers killed. Mortar used. 
Iraqi Police Colonel Abdel Qanbar 
security chief: oil installations for Mosul 
killed. Oil distribution manager 
Mohamme al-Zibari shot and wounded. 
Vehicle attack/small arms used. 
December 
7 attacks on(oil/gas)pipeline. 
 
1 attack on storage tank  
1 attack on pump station 
Baghdad, Al- Mashahda, Bayji and 




January 2 attacks on (oil /gas)pipeline Hassiba and Kirkuk/Bayji. IEDS used. 
February 2 attacks on (oil /gas)pipeline Kirkuk/Baghdad. IEDS used 
March 
3 pipeline (oil & gas) 
Explosions 
2 Oil wells (rigs) attacked  
Baghdad, Tikrit and Basra. IEDS used. 
 
First time rigs are targeted in Norhtern 
Iraq and Khabaz area. IEDS used 
April 
2 attacks on (oil /gas)pipeline 





1 Storage tank attack 
Basra, Baghdad. IEDs used 
*Three suicide boats used. (unsuccessful) 
detonated and destroyed prior to reaching 





Date Incidents Remarks 
May 
6 attacks on(oil/gas) pipeline 
 
 
1 Attack on gas plant 
Bagdhad, Basra, Kirkuk/Ceyhan and 
Musayyib. Attacks have the effect of 
halfing Iraq’s daily output for the month. 
IEDS used. 
Rocket attack on Daura oil refinery.  
June 





1 attack on personnel 
 
 
Kirkuk/Ceyhan, Bayji, Zubeir/Faw, 
Latifiyah. 
June 16 attack on 42 inch pipeline feeding 
Basra refinery brings exports from Basra 
to a halt for weeks. IEDS used. 
Ghazi Talabani Chief of Security for 
Iraq’s Northern Oil Company is killed. 
Vehicle attack 
July 
12 attacks on(oil/gas) pipeline 
 
 








1 personnel attack 
Musayyib, Taji, Safra, Thartar Lake, 
Samarra, Baghdad/Beji, al-Askari, Fatha. 
IEDS and mortars used. 
Al-Maqalai. Looters drill holes in pipeline 
and steal oil. 
 
July 17 bomb goes off prematurely killing 
perpetrator but not damaging pipeline. 
July 24 bomb goes off prematurely killing 
two perpetrators 
Northern Oil company security guard shot 
to death at checkpoint near pipeline. 
August 





I facility invasion 
 
 
1 attack on personnel 
 
 
1 Foiled attack  
1 attack on oil well 
Al-Fathea, kirkuk, Kirkuk/Ceyhan, bayji 
power station, Basra, Mussayib, 
Bezergan/Amarah, Berjisiya,West 
Babylon, West Qorna,North Baghdad, Al 
Ragdha. IEDs and RPGs 
Iraqi Southern Oil company’s 
headquarters in Basra infiltrated and a set 
fire by hundreds of attackers. 
Aug 18. Northern Oil company security 
officer killed and two others wounded 
near Kirkuk. Vehicle attack. 
Berjisiya, bomb found and defused on 
pipeline  
Amarah. RPGs fired at oil well 
September 13 attacks on (oil/gas) pipeline. 
Kirkuk Ceyhan, Al Kahbaz, Al- Fahhama, 
Rumalia 
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Date Incidents Remarks 
October 
11 attacks on (oil/gas) 
pipeline 
 
1 attack on Oil Ministry 
1 foiled attack 
Karbala, West Baghdad, Bayji, Kirkuk, 
Mashahdeh and Hayice. IEDs used. 
Rockets used. 
Bomb on pipeline defused in Khana. 
November 





1 personnel attack 
 
7 attacks on oil wells 
1 attack on storage depot and 
pumping station 
1 sabotage attack 
Riyad, Bai Hassan, Kirkuk/Bayji, Hatin, 
Sheikh Mizher, Baba Gurgun, Safa, 
Khubbaz, Taji, Safra, Sarai, Basra, Fatha, 
Babil, Bayji/Daura. IEDs used. 
Oil Ministry official Hussein Ali al Fattal, 
killed outside his home in Yarmouk. 
Khabbaz & Himreen, gunfire and IEDs 
used. 




13 attacks on(oil/gas) pipeline 
 
1 attack on Refinery 
1 kidnapping 
 
1 personnel attack 
Kirkuk, Baghdad, Samara, Bayji/ 
Baghdad, Fatha, Berjisiya. IEDs used. 
Daura refinery, mortar used.  
Northern Oil Company’s head of security 
while inspecting pipeline in Samarra. 




13 attacks on (oil/gas) 
pipeline 
 
1 refinery attack 
2 attacks on guard facilities 
Kirkuk Bayji,Musayhab, North Tikrit, 
Safra, Fatha, Zeheitoun, and Sanmrra. 
IEDS and rockets used. 
Daura 
Two guard booths blown up. No fatalities. 
February 
12 attacks on (oil/gas) 
pipeline 
 
1 personnel attack 
Samarra, Bayji/Daura, Kirkuk/Bayji, 
Fatha, Dibis, and Bajwan. IEDs used. 
Colonel Ibrahim Ahmed is killed in Ajeel, 
he was head of pipeline security.  
March 
10 attacks on (oil/gas) 
pipeline 
Al Safra, Kirkuk/Dibis, Samarra, Jofr al- 
Sakhr, Al Thartar, and Kirkuk Bayji. 
RPGs and IEDs used. 
April 
5 attacks on (oil/gas) pipeline 
 
 
1 pump station attack 
Riyad, Fatha, Kirkuk. 9 persons killed 
when bomb on pipeline went off while 




Date Incidents Remarks 
May 
6 attacks on (oil/gas) pipeline 
 
1 attack oil Ministry 
1 Fertilizer plant attacked 
1 Foiled attack 
 
1 suicide attack on pipeline 
1 attack on a pumping station 
Kirkuk, Dibiz, Baghdad and Bayji. IEDs 
used. 
Mortar used 
Basra: 1 person killed 
Bomb discovered planted near oil 
Ministry but defused. 
Kirkuk 
Athana. IED used. 
June 
9 attacks on (oil/gas) pipeline 
 
 
1 sabotage attack 
Kirkuk, Bayji, al- Fatah, 
Bayji/Daura,Yusifiyah, Baghdad. IEDS 
used. 
Valves opened to create an oil spill. 
July 
6 attacks on (oil/gas) pipeline  
 
 
1attack on railway line 
 
1 attack on a refinery 
1 personnel attack 
Daura,Byji/Baghdad, Latifiyehin, 
Samarra, Kirkuk. IEDS, and roadsie bomb 
used. 
Baghdad, setting ablaze train with 
petroleum products. 
Daura refinery mortar used. 
Two guards killed by mortar fire near 
Bayji. 
August 
6 attacks on (oil/gas) pipeline. 





I Sabotage attack on oil well 
1 attack on the oil Ministry 
North Baghdad, Kirkuk, Bayji/Baghdad.  
 Gunmen kill two employees of the oil 
Ministry & Lt. Col. Mohammed, Rashad, 
Commander of pipeline protection unit, 
assassinated at home.  
6 members of a repair crew kidnapped 
North of Baghdad. 
Oil well sabotaged. 
Mortar used. 
September 
6 attacks on (oil/gas) pipeline. 
 
 
1 personnel attack 
 
1 attack on oil tanker 
Fatha, Bayji/Baghdad, Thiaa Thiaa, 
Kirkuk/Dibis, Kirkuk/Ceyhan, 
Daura/Latifya. IEDs used. 
Two policemen killed by roadside bomb 




APPENDIX B. INTERNATIONAL ATTACKS ON ENERGY 
INFRASTRUCTURE (2000 TO 2005) 
Date Country Event 
01/29/00 Colombia FARC bombed Cano Limon pipeline 
02/03/00 Colombia Putamayo bombed section of Cano Lima pipeline 
02/08/00 Colombia ONCESA pipeline bombed near Campo Hermosos 
02/18/00 Nigeria 22 Chevron workers kidnapped including two foreign nationals 
03/14/00 Nigeria Armed youths occupy Shell Oil company and held 30 
employees hostage 
04/07/00 Nigeria Armed militants kidnapped forty persons from Elf Aquitaine Oil 
Company 
04/13/00 Colombia Cano Limon oil pipeline bombed 
04/14/00 Nigeria Armed militants kidnap 19 employees of Noble Drilling Oil 
company 
05/27/00 Indonesia Armed militants occupy a Mobil Oil production plant 
06/13/00 Nigeria Armed youths stormed two oil drilling rigs, taking 165 hostages 
10/12/00 Ecuador  Militants hijack crew helicopter and kidnap 10 oil workers 
10/07/01 United States A single bullet hole as a result of sabotage on the trans Alaska 
pipeline is discovered. This single act accounts for 260,000 
gallons of spilt oil.  
10/30/01 Sri Lanka Tamil Tigers attack and set ablaze the oil tanker MV Silk Pride, 
killing three. 
10/31/01 Vietnam British petroleum office attacked by anthrax, the bio agent was 
wrapped in a lottery ticket. Several employees infected, no 
fatalities, no group claimed responsibility 
04/11/02 Tunisia In Djerba, militants explode gas truck killing 21 
10/06/02 Yemen French oil tanker Limburg attacked by suicide bombers in small 
boat. One fatality and 90,000 barrels of oil spilt 
01/22/03 Colombia ELN blow up portion of Cano Limon pipeline 
02/06/03 Colombia FARC blow up section of Cano Limon pipeline 
03/02/03 Venezuela A car bomb near Zulia state governor’s office destroys part of 
U.S. oil company Chevron’s office. 
03/20/03 India One person is killed when an oil tanker is bombed. No one 
claims responsibility 
05/27/03 Colombia Cano Limon oil pipeline bombed 
05/30/03 Colombia A section of oil pipeline in the Canlon district is bombed 
06/09/03 Peru Shining Path kidnap 71 workers from Technist Group working 
on a natural gas pipeline 
07/10/03 Colombia 7,000 barrels of oil spilt in attack on Cano Limon pipeline 
05/01/04 Saudi Arabia Six expatriate workers killed in an attack on oil company 
facility. 
05/29/04 Saudi Arabia Al Khobar oil facility seized 22 expatriate workers killed in 
Saudi Special Forces rescue operation. 
12/05/04 Nigeria Approximately 300 armed villagers in Kula seize three oil flow 
stations. 
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Date Country Event 
01/08/05 Pakistan Baluch tribesmen attack Pakistan Petroleum Limited’s Sui 
natural gas purification plant shutting it down and shutting in 
45% of Pakistan’s natural gas, causing shortages  
03/08/05 Iran A bomb explodes outside BP’s main office in Tehran. (no 
injuries )  
06/02/05 United States Bomb placed inside a natural gas pipe on natural gas rig in 
Montgomery County Kansas kills two and injures a third. 
Bombing was carried by a U.S. national and listed as intentional 
by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
07/26/05 Somalia An oil tanker is attacked 160 km from shore by armed pirates  
2005  It has been estimated to date that between 50-70 employees of 
Royal Dutch Shell have been kidnapped in Nigeria at the time of 
writing 
From: Compiled on 2005-06-13 from “Terrorism& Oil,” Neal Adams, Tulsa. Pennwell: 2003, MAJOR 
TERRORIST INCIDENTS 1998-2004© Tim Ripley, 2004; & 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/chron03.html, Last accessed November 20, 2005 
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